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Introduction 
Coffee producers, local coffee markets and co-operatives 
Every year more than 6 million tons of coffee is produced in different parts of the world, 
mainly in developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Because there is little 
scope for economies of scale in coffee production, most of the producers are smallholders 
(Oxfam 2001). Coffee is a typical tropical cash crop, about three quarters of it is exported, 
mostly to industrialized countries (ICO 2009). Due to inelastic supply and demand, the 
international coffee prices are highly fluctuating. Furthermore, a stronger increase in supply 
than demand has resulted in a general downward trend (Lewin et al. 2004).  
The small scale coffee farmers do not export the coffee themselves. Generally it is 
bought in the rural markets by local intermediaries who in turn sell the coffee to exporters, 
mostly multinational companies. Factors such as isolation and asymmetric information make 
these local markets prone to market failure, including market power among purchasers. An 
alternative for the coffee farmers is to organise themselves in coffee co-operatives and market 
their coffee jointly. But there are many difficulties along this path: The poor and often 
uneducated farmers must acquire knowledge about how to run an organisation, and how to 
manage the complicated affairs of coffee processing and exports. For a newly established, 
unknown co-operative it is also extremely hard to get access to the international coffee 
market. The wish from many consumers to help disadvantaged producers overcome these 
problems has led to the establishing of solidarity based labelling schemes. Increasingly, many 
coffee co-operatives are certified to organic and Fairtrade standards, which may facilitate 
market access and provide them with higher and more stable prices from the importers, but 
which in return requires them to fulfil a range of criteria concerning both production and 
administration. 
 The characteristics of local coffee markets and the existence of Fairtrade and 
organically certified coffee co-operatives is the setting for this thesis. This setting provides the 
possibility to investigate questions related to market structures in rural areas, the role of co-
operatives and how they are affected by the Fairtrade criteria for certification. 
Coffee market background 
History of coffee 
The coffee plant is originally from Ethiopia. It is a bush that gets white, fragrant flowers 
which turn into red, sometimes yellow berries. Supposedly the Ethiopians ate the sweet 
tasting berries and chewed the kernel inside, which contains the today wide famous 
stimulating substance caffeine. One assumes that Ethiopians took the plant to Yemen, where, 
among others, it was produced by Arab monks who needed it in order to stay awake for the 
midnight prayer. Coffee drinking was soon popular all over the Arab Empire, and in the 16th 
century it found its way to Europe through the Turkish. In 1721 the first coffee beans were 
brought to Brazil via the French colony Martinique (Pendergrast 1999).  
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 The coffee plant requires stringent climatic conditions such as average annual 
temperatures between 17 and 25 degrees Celsius and a minimum of 1200-1500 millimetres of 
rainfall each year, conditions that are only found within the tropics (Talbot 2004 p. 31). In 
many places in Latin America the climatic and geographical conditions are highly suitable for 
coffee production, and soon this became the continent where most of the production in the 
world took place. The plant was and still is cultivated on nearly the entire Latin American 
continent, including the Caribbean Islands.  
At the turning of the 19th century, the world experienced the first coffee crisis. Because 
of overproduction, coffee prices decreased by 44% in 5 years (Gonzalez Cid 2004). What 
triggered this price fall was what Talbot calls the ‘tree crop price cycle’ (Talbot 2004), a 
phenomenon to be repeated several times over the twentieth century. It takes three to five 
years from the planting of a coffee tree until harvesting of the berries can start, and the optimal 
yield is reached when the tree is five to six years old. Because it is difficult to increase 
production in the short term the supply elasticity of coffee with respect to price is low. The 
price elasticity of demand is also low: coffee consumption tends to drop only when prices 
increase significantly (Daviron and Ponte 2005). A tree crop cycle is typically triggered by 
unexpected frosts or diseases that destroy large amounts of coffee. This has often happened in 
Brasil, the world’s largest producer, and it causes a supply shock, which leads to a price 
increase. When the coffee prices are high, more farmers will plant new coffee trees. But the 
response on the supply side is usually higher than necessary, and some years later, when the 
new trees have matured, there will be oversupply and coffee prices will drop. Many coffee 
farmers will then replace their trees with other crops, supply will drop, and prices increase 
again. Higher prices will then lead to oversupply, and so the cycle continues.  
Already after the first significant price drop in the early 1900s, producers began to 
pressure their states to take action against these fluctuations. Coffee was very important for 
Third World producer countries and it is still their second biggest revenue source, after petrol 
(Talbot 2004 p.44). Also consumer countries saw the need to regulate supply in order to 
stabilise prices, both for economic reasons and as part of a political strategy to inhibit the rise 
of communism in poor, coffee producing countries (Talbot 2004). In 1962 the first 
International Coffee Agreement (ICA) was signed. This was a regulatory system that lasted 
until 1989. During this period quotas distributed to producer members of the International 
Coffee Organisation (ICO) were relaxed or tightened in order to keep coffee prices stable. 
Although there were several problems with this system it was successful in raising and 
stabilizing coffee prices (Daviron and Ponte 2005 p. 87, Talbot 2004). One of the main 
reasons for the demise of the regulation in 1989 was that it was leading to overproduction, and 
the producer countries found it increasingly difficult to agree on the quota distributions. 
Another factor undermining the system was the development of a non-quota market in 
countries that were not part of the agreement, and that re exported to consumer countries that 
had signed it (Talbot 2004).   
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Coffee in Chiapas 
The coffee plant was introduced to Mexico, then a Spanish colony, about 200 years ago. Since 
1810 it has been cultivated commercially in the country. At first the beans were sold only for 
national consumption, but with growing demand in Europe and the United States, exported 
volumes increased (Gonzalez Cid 2004). In Chiapas, the most southern state in Mexico, 
coffee production started to take off during the era of President Porfirio Díaz1. Immigrants, 
particularly Germans, played an important role in the introduction of coffee to the region, as 
they invested capital, brought in technology and controlled the trade and exportation (Renard 
2006). Plantations were established mainly on virgin land, at first in Soconusco, the Southern 
region of Chiapas. Coffee cultivation is relatively labour intensive. The branches of the 
bushes must be pruned, plants need to be fertilised and frequent weeding is necessary. In 
particular the harvest requires a lot of labour, as the berries do not all ripen at the same time 
and need to be picked in several rounds. Lack of labour in the area was a problem for the 
coffee plantation owners in Soconusco, and the solution was to bring in indigenous people 
from the Highlands, Los Altos, through a system of enrolment (“enganche”). They were 
promised work and transported to the plantations. By the time they arrived they had indebted 
themselves and had no option but to work for several years (Martinez-Torres 2006). With the 
agrarian reforms starting in 1939, many of these workers took over the plantations and 
divided the land between them, forming so-called ejidos, a system with common land shared 
among members of the communities. In Los Altos, coffee was introduced by workers 
returning from Soconusco with coffee seedlings. But because there were few coffee buyers in 
the area, production only started to take off  in the seventies. Later coffee production became 
common also in the Northern (Norte) and jungle (Selva) region.  
According to Renard (2006), the dynamics of the coffee sector in Mexico changed 
radically in the sixties and seventies due to the creation of the Mexican Coffee Institute 
(Inmecafé) in 1959. During the era of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) coffee boards 
and quasi governmental organizations regulated to some extent coffee production and sales 
within each producer country. In Mexico this was the responsibility of Inmecafé who, apart 
from buying a large part of the coffee production in Mexico, was in charge of agronomical 
investigations, technical assistance and the organisation of the small scale coffee producers to 
whom they provided credit (Nolasco 1985 p. 230). In order to better reach the producers 
special coffee organisations, the so-called UEPCs,2 were created. At the most, 56% of the 
producers were organised in these organisations (Giovannucci and Juarez 2006). The 
remaining producers sold their coffee to the local intermediaries.  
With the debt crisis of the 1980s, the Mexican government could no longer afford the 
expensive program initiated by Inmecafé, and without finance the majority of these 
organisations disappeared. When the ICA was not renewed in 1989 Inmecafé was dismantled. 
Since then the Mexican domestic coffee market has been unregulated by public authorities.  
                                                 
1 From 1884 to 1911 
2 Unidades Económicas de Producción y Comercialización. 
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Two parallel markets 
The existence of the UEPCs and other co-operatives meant that there were two parallel 
markets in rural Chiapas: a conventional market and a co-operative market. At the 
conventional market the intermediaries, the so-called ‘coyotes’, bought coffee from 
independent producers and sold it to processors and exporters, often passing through other 
intermediaries first. With the dismantling of the ICA and Inmecafé, a process of market 
concentration started at the level of exporters (Solís 2000). Multinational companies took over 
larger and larger shares of the market, while national exporters were closed down. Part of the 
reason for this was the coffee crisis of the early 1990s, when prices went very low and 
exporters ran into financial difficulties. Increasingly the ‘coyotes’ started to work not for 
themselves, but for the multinational companies (ibid). Over the years the number of 
multinational companies was also reduced, which meant a still higher level of market 
concentration. The same trend was observed in other coffee producing countries (Talbot 
2004). This led to the market structure often observed today, with market power at several 
levels: the multinational companies have market power over the intermediaries, who, because 
of contracts, cannot decide to sell to who they want. The intermediaries in turn have market 
power in front of the coffee producers, who live in isolated areas and have few other sales 
options.  
In the seventies and eighties the main actors in the co-operative market were the UEPC 
coffee co-operatives who sold their coffee to Inmecafé. But although the UEPCs had an 
important economic function, few of them were authentic, democratic organisations with 
active participation of the members. According to Parra and Moguel (1998) verticality and 
bureaucratism were obstacles for the participation of the beneficiaries, and corruption was not 
uncommon during this period. This is probably the reason why most of them disappeared 
together with Inmecafé and the ICA. However, during the Inmecafé era there existed co-
operatives that were strong and independent. They formed their own credit unions, aiming to 
liberate themselves from the state (Renard 1996). When Inmecafé was closed the 
cooperatives’ saw that their earnings from selling to the private purchasers were much lower 
than what they had achieved in the Inmecafé era. Some joined forces and started looking for 
possibilities to export directly, but with little resources if was difficult for them to market the 
coffee and provide members with training in quality coffee production. Their exporting project 
was therefore abandoned (Renard 1996). However, an alternative to exporting conventional 
coffee appeared in 1989: the Fairtrade labelling scheme, in addition to the already existing 
organic scheme.  
Fairtrade is a label that enables consumers to show solidarity with disadvantaged 
producers, and be sure that they receive an acceptable deal in terms of price and working 
conditions. There are different certification schemes that make similar claims, but in this 
thesis focus is on the Fairtrade labelling system which started in 1989 and which is run by the 
Fairtrade Labelling Organisation International (FLO), with headquarters in Bonn, Germany. 
The world’s first Fairtrade certified co-operative was Oaxaca based UCIRI, who, under the 
leadership of the Dutch priest Franz Van der Hof founded the system together with the Max 
Havelaar Foundation in the Netherlands. As the system expanded to most of Europe and the 
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US, the name of the label changed from Max Havelaar to Fairtrade, and the umbrella 
organisation, the Fairtrade Labelling Organisation International (FLO) was founded. The 
system makes it possible for any commercial company to purchase products from certified 
producers in the South and put a ‘Fairtrade’ label on it for consumers to recognise. Only 
coffee farmers organised in co-operatives can become certified, and they are expected to fulfil 
certain requirements. They should consist of generally small scale producers, be able to 
export their coffee, provide members with economic and social benefits, and be democratic, 
transparent organizations run by the producers themselves. There are also environmental 
criteria on the use of chemical inputs, and social criteria on the use of hired labour.  
As with Fairtrade, organic coffee is sold with a label that consumers can recognise, but 
the requirements to become certified are only concerned with cultivation methods. Organic 
producers are to avoid damage to the environment and any contamination of the product from 
chemical input. Since no chemical fertilisers, herbicides or pesticides may be used organic 
coffee production involves intensive use of labour, mainly for manual weeding, and for 
making organic compost for fertilising. Additionally, in hilly areas it is necessary to construct 
terraces and barriers to avoid soil erosion. Organic coffee always grows under the shade of 
other trees, which helps maintain favourable temperature and humidity, provides leaf litter to 
replenish the soil and supports beneficial insects that keep potential pests under control 
(Martinez-Torres 2006 p.19). Several studies have found that, in comparison with 
conventional coffee production, especially sun grown, organic coffee cultivation has 
considerable beneficial effects on the environment in terms of higher biodiversity 
conservation, less soil degradation and pollution, and more carbon capturing (Gobbi 2000, 
Lyngbæk 2001, Perez Grovas 2000, Bray et al. 2002).  
There are several organic certifying bodies operating in Mexico, but the majority of the 
coffee co-operatives use the Mexican organisation Certimex. The certifying bodies do not only 
set requirements concerned with environment and health. They also promote cultivation 
methods that have as a main effect to improve the quality of the coffee. The quality aspect is 
important, considering that few consumers will buy a product and pay a premium only 
because of its environmental or social values (Bray et al 2002). Promoting quality enhancing 
methods is thus meant to ensure that there will not only be production, but also sales. 
Additionally, the superior quality brings about an increased coffee price offer, which, as found 
in a study from Central America, can be even more important than the organic and Fairtrade 
premium (Kilian et al. 2006).  
Producer organisations or co-operatives become certified once an inspector from the 
certification organisation has made a first visit and found that the requirements are fulfilled. 
After this, a control visit is made every year or every second year3. The co-operatives cover 
the costs for certification. If they manage to find importers for their labelled coffee, they will 
receive a premium per pound4 and, in the case of Fairtrade, a guaranteed minimum price of 
121 US cent/lb. 
                                                 
3 Up until 2005 the control visits from FLO were rather irregular, afterwards the policy has been that there 
should be one visit every year 
4 For Fairtrade coffee the premium is 10 cents/lb, for organic it varies between 10 and 20 cents/lb. 
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Throughout the 1990s these two labelling systems made it possible for an increasing 
number of co-operatives in Mexico to reach the international market. It turned out that these 
market niches had a substantial growth potential. At the end of 2006 there were 241 Fairtrade 
certified coffee producer organisations in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Speciality coffee, 
meaning coffee that is distinct superior to common coffee beverages offered, has over the last 
decade grown at approximately 20 per cent per annum, and it is estimated that 2 per cent of 
global coffee sales are certified to one or another sustainable standard (Potts 2007). This has 
led to a considerable growth in the number of co-operatives in Chiapas that are either 
Fairtrade, organically certified or both.  
The initiative to become certified usually comes from the co-operative itself, which 
might have heard about the certification scheme from another co-operative in the region. This 
could explain why Mexico, the country of origin for Fairtrade, today has the most FLO 
registered co-operatives in the world. In 2006 there were 38 Fairtrade certified coffee co-
operatives in Mexico, with more than 20 000 members (FLO 2006). Mexico has also seen an 
exceptional growth in organic cultivation during the last ten years, with an increase from 
20 000 ha in 1996 to 147 000 ha in 2005 (Gomez Cruz et al. 2005). This means that today 
approximately 20% of the coffee area in Mexico is certified organic. Half of the organically 
certified land in Mexico belongs to members of coffee co-operatives, and the other half are 
plantations. Chiapas is Mexico’s most important producer of organic coffee, with more than 
half of the organic coffee land situated here (Gomez Cruz et al. 2005). This growth in organic 
coffee production is of course linked to the growing demand for speciality coffee, and for 
organic coffee in particular. In addition, during the last few years, and particularly after the 
Zapatista resurrection in 1994, the Mexican government has increased its support to 
organisations in Chiapas, and has encouraged organic production by covering the certification 
costs.  
Research questions 
This thesis investigates the local coffee market from several angles: The first paper looks at 
the conventional, non labelled local coffee purchasing market and  investigates theoretically 
implications of a market structure with imperfect competition at two stages: among exporters 
and among local middlemen. In the second paper the co-operative is introduced to this setting 
of non perfect local purchasing markets. The aim is to find out what effect the presence of 
Fairtrade and organic co-operatives has on local prices offered to non members. The third 
paper takes a closer look at the co-operative as an entity, and investigates the internal structure 
of Fairtrade certified co-operatives, in particular the relation between democracy and 
economic success.  
1. Exporters, middlemen and coffee farmers: A simple model of 
strategic pricing behaviour 
Local purchasing markets in Chiapas are typically characterised by market power on two 
levels: at the hands of the middlemen, who buy coffee from the farmers, and at the hands of 
the exporter, to whom the middlemen sell the coffee. Inspired by this rather complex market 
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setting, this paper provides a description of the profit maximising strategies of monopsonist 
middlemen operating in different, geographically separated markets, and a monosponist 
exporter. Depending on transport costs, middlemen will either compete or remain in autarky: 
when transport costs are high relative to the price they are offered by the exporter, they 
restrain from competition, for lower transport costs they enter into duopsony competition. The 
competitive situation among middlemen in turn influences the profits of the exporter. Autarky 
generally reduces the amount purchased by the middlemen, and thereby reduces the profits of 
the exporter. But when local transport costs are high relative to the international price, the 
exporter may have an incentive to offer a low price to induce autarky instead of competition, 
and thereby avoid transportation costs inflating the price in the supply chain. The model 
demonstrates that there may be discontinuities in prices with respect to local transportation 
costs. The analysis shows the relatively complex relationship between prices at the different 
levels and local transportation costs. An interesting finding is that a reduction in 
transportation costs (below a certain critical level) leads to a price increase to farmers and a 
price reduction to middlemen. 
2. The pro-competitive effect of coffee co-operatives in Chiapas, 
Mexico 
The question I ask in this paper is whether or not coffee co-operatives in Chiapas have a pro-
competitive effect on the private intermediaries in the markets where these two types of 
purchasers coexist. Interview based field research in Chiapas indicates that there are entry 
barriers to coffee purchasing, and that since private purchasers do not always compete with 
each other they are able to underpay the producers who are often isolated, uninformed about 
price developments and in the need for credit. The field research also gives some evidence 
that when there is a co-operative in an area, in many cases it makes the local intermediaries 
behave more competitively.  
 The pro-competitive effect can be explained by a theoretical model. It is assumed that 
there are certain costs related to co-operative membership, hence different producers have 
different levels of net benefits from membership. The costs imply that those who enter the co-
operative are the ones who receive the most benefits from it. This has consequences for how 
the co-operative affects a market dominated by private purchasers in imperfect competition. 
The price offered by the private intermediary determines how many producers find it 
worthwhile to enter the co-operative. The lower the private purchaser price, the more 
producers will find it more beneficial for them to become members of the co-operative. This 
means that although there are certain costs involved in co-operative membership, as long as 
the co-operative is an option to the non members its presence tends to increase the coffee 
price also to the non members. The extent of the pro-competitive effect depends on the costs 
and benefits of co-operative membership. 
 A statistical analysis is carried out with coffee price data from Chiapas at municipality 
level. Different OLS regressions are run in order to see if municipalities with more organic or 
Fairtrade co-operatives have a higher price level compared to municipalities with less co-
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operatives. The study gives support to the hypothesis that co-operatives have a pro-
competitive effect in terms of higher price offers to non co-operative members. 
3. Democracy and economic success 
The Fairtrade certified coffee co-operatives are required to have democratic structures in their 
organisations. Democracy may enhance empowerment of marginalised small scale coffee 
producers, but the effect on the economic performance is not necessarily positive. 
 A case study among Fairtrade co-operatives in Chiapas confirms the findings from 
previous studies. On the positive side, democracy is important for the control of leadership. In 
developing countries where corruption is widespread this is particularly important. Also, 
democracy means that members have more influence on the decisions taken, which may lead 
to better management and more legitimised projects which are easier to implement. On the 
negative side, democracy may be time consuming and expensive and thereby reduce 
economic performance. 
 In order to see how the two aspects, democracy and economic performance, are 
correlated, an econometric analysis is performed with data from the Fairtrade Labelling 
Organisation. The data base consists of evaluations of Latin American coffee co-operatives 
made between 2001 and 2005. Regression analyses, both OLS and fixed effects, are 
performed using both prices offered by co-operatives relative to local prices, and a general 
variable for economic success, which includes a range of different measures. The results 
support the hypothesis that democracy and economic success in the co-operatives are 
positively correlated. 
 
References: 
 
Bray, David Barton; Sánchez, José Luis Plaza; Murphy, Ellen Contreras (2002): ‘Social Dimensions 
of Organic Coffee Production in Mexico: Lessons for Eco-Labeling Initiatives,’ Society and 
Natural Resources 15: 429-446 
Daviron, B. and Ponte, S. (2005). ”The Coffee Paradox –Global Markets, Commodity Trade and the 
Elusive Promise of Development”. Zed Books 
FLO (2006): FLO evaluations provided to the author March 2006. 
Giovannucci, Daniele. and Juárez Cruz, Ricardo. (2006): ‘Análisis Prospectivo de Política Cafetalera’. 
FAO: Mexico 
Gobbi, José A (2000): ‘Is biodiversity-friendly coffee financially viable? An analysis of five different 
coffee production systems in western El Salvador,’ Ecological Economics 33: 267-281 
Gomez Cruz, Manuel Angel, Schwentesius Rindermann, Rita, Meraz Alvarado, Ma. Del Refugio,  
Lobato García, Aurora, Gomez Tovar, Laura (2005): ‘Agricultura, Apicultura y Ganadería 
Orgánicas de México – 2005 Situación – Retos – Tendencias.’ Universidad Autónoma 
Chapingo 
González Cid, Pablo (2004): ‘El café en México’ Editorial México Desconocido, S.A. de C.V. 
ICO (2009). www.ico.org 
xii 
 
Kilian, Bernard; Jones, Connie; Pratt, Lawrence, Villalobos, Andrés (2006): ‘Is sustainable agriculture 
a viable strategy to improve farm income in Central America? A case study on coffee,’ Journal 
of Business Research 59: 322-330 
Lewin, Bryan; Giovannucci, Daniele & Varangis, Panos (2004): ‘Coffee Markets: New Paradigms in 
Global Supply and Demand,’ World Bank Working Paper  
Lyngbæk A.E., Muschler, R.G. and Sinclair F.L. (2001): ‘Productivity and profitability of multistrata 
organic versus conventional coffee farms in Costa Rica,’ Agroforestry Systems 53: 205-213 
Martinez-Torres, Maria Elena (2006):  ‘Organic Coffee: Sustainable Development by Mayan 
Farmers’. Ohio University Press 
Nolasco, M. (1985). ”Café y sociedad en México”. Centro de Ecodesarrollo. México 
Parra V., M. y Moguel V., R. 1998. La emergencia de organizaciones no gubernamentales de 
cafeticultores indígenas en Chiapas. Estrategias frente a las políticas agrícolas. En: Méndez, 
J.L. (coord.). Organizaciones civiles y políticas públicas en México y Centroamérica. 
Academia Mexicana de investigación en Políticas Públicas, A.C. México. Págs. 321-467. 
 
Oxfam (Brown, O., Charavat, C., & Eagleton, D.) (2001): ‘The coffee market: A background study’. 
London: Oxfam. 
Pendergrast, Mark (1999): ‘Uncommon grounds : the history of coffee and how it transformed our 
world’. New York : Basic Books 
Perez Grovas, Victor (2000): ‘Evaluación de la sustentabilidad del sistema de manejo de café orgánico 
en la unión de ejidos Majomut, región de los Altos de Chiapas’. In ‘Sustentabilidad y sistemas 
campesinos. Cinco experiencias de evaluación en el México rural. Masera’, Omar y López-
Ridaura (Ed), SantiagoMundi-Prensa 
Potts, Jason (2007): ‘Alternative trade initiatives and income predictability: Theory and evidence from 
the coffee sector’ International Institute for Sustainable Development 
Renard, M. (1996). ”Les interstices de la globalisation. Un label (Max Havelaar) pour les petits 
producteurs de café”, PhD thesis, University of Toulouse 
Renard, Marie- Christine (2006): ‘Calidad y certificación del café: Significados e implicaciones,’ in El 
cafetal del futuro: Realidades y Visiones. Ed. Pohlan, J., Soto, L., Barrera, J. Shaker Verlag.  
Solís, Daniel Villafurte (2000): ‘El café en la frontera sur’ Universidad de Ciencias y Artes de Chiapas 
Talbot, John M. (2004). ‘Grounds for Agreement. The political Economy of the Coffee Commodity 
Chain’.  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
 
 
 
Exporters, middlemen, and co¤ee farmers: A
simple model of strategic pricing
Kjetil Bjorvatn, Anna Birgitte Milford
Department of Economics,
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration,
Helleveien 30, 5045 Bergen, Norway
March 3, 2010
Abstract
Agricultural markets in developing countries are typically charac-
terized by a concentration of buyer power. Inspired by eld work on
local co¤ee markets in Chiapas, Mexico, we analyze how market power
on two levels, both at the hands of middlemen who buy co¤ee from the
farmers, and at the hands of an exporter, to whom the middlemen sell
the co¤ee, a¤ects the equilibrium prices in the vertical supply chain.
In particular, we demonstrate that the exporter, as a rst mover, may
have an incentive to strategically set the price o¤ered to middlemen
in order to a¤ect the upstream market structure. In particular, we
demonstrate that when local transportation costs are low relative to
the international price, the exporter o¤ers a high price in order to
stimulate competition between the middlemen. In contrast, when lo-
cal transportation costs are relatively high, the exporter strategically
o¤ers a lower price in order to prevent upstream competition. We
show that there is a rather complex relationship between equilibrium
pricess and local transportation costs, characterized by a disconinuity,
and by opposing price movements to farmers and middlemen.
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1 Introduction
Local co¤ee markets in developing countries are typically characterized by
a high level of concentration of traders (Talbot 2004, Daviron and Ponte
2005). The concentration is at two levels: Upstream, where small scale co¤ee
farmers deal with a limited number of middlemen, and downstream, where
the middlemen are linked to one particular exporter (Nolasco 1985, Solís
2000, Talbot 2004).
The ambition of our paper is to study the pricing strategies of the exporter
in its relation with the middlemen, and how these strategies in turn a¤ect the
price that co¤ee farmers receive. In particular, we are concerned with how
the quality of the local infrastructure, as captured by the transportation cost,
a¤ects price setting in the vertical structure. An underlying premise is that
the exporter does not directly deal with the co¤ee farmers. Instead, purchases
take place via middlemen who rely on the exporters for access to capital.
Moreover, the exporter cannot control the price setting of the middlemen
directly. The only way for the exporter to inuence the transactions upstream
is through its price o¤er to the middlemen.
Our analysis is related to the literature on vertical restraints (for an
overview, see Rey and Vergé, 2005). The starting point in that literature
is the problem of double marginalization (Spengler, 1950). When both pro-
ducer and retailer enjoys monopoly power, they both add a markup to their
costs, and this leads to an excessively high price. The literature shows that
vertical integration could solve this problem, allowing the integrated com-
pany to make higher prots by lowering the price, which would of course also
be benecial to consumers. Alternatively, joint prots can be maximized by
the producer imposing a price ceiling, or by writing a two-part tari¤ with
the retailer, charging a wholesale price equal to the marginal cost, and then
shifting prot by using a franchise fee.
Our paper deals not with seller power, but buyer power. The problem of
double marginalization in our study is therefore not an excessively high price
to consumer, but an excessively low price to producers. Moreover, we ana-
lyze how a linear price contract can be used strategically by the leading rm
(the exporter) to extract rents from lower level rms (the middlemen). We
thus abstract from access to more complex, non-linear contracts, for instance
because of di¢ culties in making such contracts legally binding. On the other
hand, we add complexity by analyzing ways in which the leading rm can
use the linear price to a¤ect the upstream market structure to its advan-
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tage. This has some similarity with Rey and Stiglitz (1995). In this study
the authors focus on how use of exclusive territories can dampen competi-
tion and thus increase prots. The modelling framework is however rather
di¤erent from ours. In particular, Rey and Stiglitz consider competition on
the higher and lower level of the vertical supply chain, whereas we abstract
from downstream competition. Moreover, they abstract from the geographi-
cal dimension, looking at an integrated market. In our paper, the upstream
markets are separated by transportation costs. Transportation costs are also
taken into account in the work by Merel et al (2009). Their article shows how
competition between middlemen a¤ects purchasing price in a spatial model,
where producers are located uniformly on a line. The authors focus on the
complex e¤ect of transportation costs on the equilibrium price. The export
price is taken as given, and hence there is no strategic pricing in their model,
which clearly sets it apart from our contribution.
We demonstrate that under some conditions, it is in the exporters best
interest to stimulate competition between the middle men by o¤ering a high
purchasing price, while under other conditions, it is better to prevent such
competition by o¤ering a low purchasing price. Key variables determining
the exporters choice are the local transportation costs, and the international
co¤ee price. More precisely, we demonstrate that when the international
price is low relative to local transportation costs, the exporter chooses a low
price in order to cut costs, even if this means a low supply of co¤ee. When
the international price is high relative to local transportation costs, on the
other hand, it chooses high price in order to ensure a higher supply of co¤ee.
The paper is organized as follows. We rst present the model, starting by
dening the payo¤s to middlemen and exporters for a given market structure.
We then, in Section 3, analyze the pricing strategies of the exporter, and show
how the international price a¤ects equilibrium price markups in the vertical
chain. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a co¤ee producing area consisting of two rural regions, A and B.
There are three types of agents in this region; exporters, local purchasers,
and small-scale co¤ee farmers. The small scale farmers sell their co¤ee to the
local co¤ee purchasers, who we shall refer to as middlemen, who then trans-
port the co¤ee to an exporter in an urban centre. We simplify by assuming
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that farmers cannot transport the co¤ee themselves to the urban centers,
perhaps because of prohibitively high transportation costs. There is one cof-
fee purchasing middleman in each region, purchaser a and b, respectively.
The middlemen may buy co¤ee from the neighboring region, in which case a
per unit transportation cost d applies. There is a single exporter in the area,
to whom both middlemen sell their co¤ee. Figure 1 illustrates the market
structure. The arrows leading from co¤ee farmers in one region to the mid-
dleman in the other region are dashed, since such sales do not necessarily
take place.
Figure 1: Market structure
There is monopsony power on two levels in this market: The exporter
exercises monopsony power in its relation with the middlemen, while the
middlemen exercise monopsony power in their relation with the co¤ee farm-
ers. Being numerous, the farmers are price takers in the local market. The
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middlemen o¤er a price given by the farmersreservation price, w, which in
turn is determined by the quantity supplied q. The marginal cost of harvest-
ing co¤ee is assumed to be increasing in the quantity supplied. Hence w(q)
is increasing in q. For simplicity, let w (q) = q.
This market structure resembles the one observed in the local co¤ee
purchasing market in Chiapas. In this region there has lately been an in-
creased tendency of market concentration among exporting companies, and
it is estimated that 85% of the co¤ee is exported through the four largest
multinational companies (Bellino 2002). This concentration implies that in
some areas, particularly the more isolated ones, all the co¤ee purchasing
middlemen sell to just one multinational exporter who provides them with a
low interest loan used for co¤ee purchases. The exporter informs them about
international co¤ee prices, and the middlemen adjust the price they pay the
producers to the price they know that they will receive from the exporter.
Furthermore, interviews with producers and middlemen, conducted by one of
the authors, suggest that the middlemen generally buy co¤ee from the same
villages, and very often from the same producers every year.1
The assumption of an upward sloping supply curve might perhaps seem
implausible for the short term, since it takes two to four years from a co¤ee
tree is planted until berries can be harvested. However, when prices get to a
very low level, many farmers, and especially those who have to hire workers
to harvest, cut down on plantation maintenance activities such as fertilizing
and weeding, and this decreases the yields (Solís 2000). When prices are very
low, some will not even harvest their co¤ee, but will instead look for work
elsewhere. On the other hand, when the prices are higher, the farmers can
put more e¤ort into cultivation and harvesting, taking several rounds and
picking everything down to the last berry.
The sequence of moves is as follows. First, the exporter o¤ers the mid-
dlemen a price p per unit of co¤ee. The middlemen take this price as given,
which is reasonable, since there are many more middlemen than exporters.
Second, the middlemen o¤er the farmers a price w for their co¤ee. Depend-
ing on the price o¤er from the exporter, the middlemen may nd it in their
interest to source co¤ee not only from their own region, but also from the
neighboring region. The farmers take the price o¤er as given, which again
is reasonable, since there are typically few middlemen in a region. Third,
sales are realized: The middlemen buy co¤ee at a price w, and the associ-
1Interviews conducted by Milford in Chiapas in 2007.
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ated quantity q, and then sell this co¤ee to the exporter at a price p, and the
exporter then sells the co¤ee to the world market at the given world market
price P . Following the logic of backward induction, we start by analyzing
the pricing behavior of the middlemen.
2.1 Middlemen
If transportation costs are su¢ ciently high, each middleman fully controls
purchases in his local market. His monopsony prots are given by:
ma = 
m
b = (p  wi) qi; i = a; b (1)
Since wi = qi we nd the prot maximizing price and quantity as:
wm = qm =
p
2
; (2)
and equilibrium prots for each middleman in this scenario as:
m =
1
4
p2: (3)
If transportation costs are su¢ ciently low, there is price competition be-
tween the middlemen, with the intensity of competition dampened by the per
unit transport cost d: The two middlemen bid the price up until they reach
the point where they are indi¤erent between catering only to local supply,
or paying the transport costs and thereby capturing the entire market in the
area, that is all the co¤ee in markets A and B. In a Nash-Bertrand equilib-
rium, the purchasing price in both regions must be the same, and given by
w. The equilibrium is dened by the following equation:
(p  w)w = (p  w)w + (p  d  w)w; (4)
where the left hand side gives prots from the middlemans own region,
and the right hand side gives prots from selling to both regions, and thereby
capturing the entire market, by o¤ering a price w + ". In equilibrium, it
cannot be possible for one middleman to capture the neighboring market.
Hence, competition between the two pushes prices up to the point where they
are indi¤erent between purchasing only from farmers in their own region, and
also buying from those in the neighboring region. From (4), the equilibrium
purchasing price can be found as:
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wd = qd = p  d: (5)
Note that in equilibrium, there is no interregional trade. We observe that
wd increases in p and falls in d: A higher price o¤er p from the exporter makes
it more tempting to capture the entire market, and thus intensies competi-
tion, leading to a higher price o¤er w to the farmers. Higher transportation
costs d reduces the competitive pressure between the two middlemen, and
allows them to reduce the purchasing price w. Indeed, if d = 0 the two
regional markets are fully integrated, and the middlemen are left with no
market power. Bertrand competition in this case leads to w = p. Given wd,
each middleman makes a duopsony prot given by:
d = d (p  d) : (6)
The price wd applies as long as wd  wm. For wd < wm, competition
is not a binding constraint on the middlemens price o¤er to the farmers.
This is true when local transportation costs are su¢ ciently high relative to
the price o¤er that the middlemen receive from the exporter. The critical
transport costs can be found as:
wm = wd , d = p=2  d (7)
Figure 2 illustrates the middlemens price o¤er w to the farmers as a func-
tion of local transportation costs d, for a given price o¤er from the exporter
(p = 1). The equilibrium price o¤er of the middlemen is given by the solid
part of the wm and wd lines.
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2.2 Exporter
We now turn to the choice of the rst mover, the exporter. The exporters
prots (in its dealing with each middleman) can then be expressed as:
 = (P   p) qi: (8)
where P is the international price. The exporter knows that the middle-
mens price o¤er to the farmers is given by either wd (for d < d) or wm (for
d  d). It also knows that the associated quantities purchased from the
farmers by each middleman is qd or qm, respectively. Moreover, the exporter
realizes that since d is a function of p, it can inuence whether the middle-
men o¤ers the high-price, high-quantity contract
 
wd; qd

to the farmers, or
the low-price, low-quantity contract (wm; qm). In the following we analyze
the optimal pricing strategy for the exporter. Assume rst that d  d so
that there is upstream autarky, implying that each middleman buys a quan-
tity qm = p=2. Using this information in (8) and maximizing with respect
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to p, the optimal price o¤ered to the middlemen is:
pm =
P
2
; (9)
implying that the equilibrium quantity purchased is
qm =
P
4
: (10)
The exporters prots in this case is thus:
m =
1
8
P 2: (11)
We can also calculate a middlemans prot in this case by using (9) in
(3) as:
m =
1
16
P 2 (12)
Turning to the case of d < d, i.e., when the middlemen compete, we know
that in this case the quantity supplied by each middleman is qd = p d, given
by (5). Using this information, and maximizing with respect to p, we nd
the exporters optimal purchasing price as:
pd =
P + d
2
: (13)
Observe that a higher transportation cost d leads to a higher price o¤er
pd from the exporter. The reason is that a higher d leads to a lower price
from middleman to farmer, and therefore a lower quantity purchased. In
order to stimulate supply, the exporter raises its price. Indeed, the duopsony
price paid to the middlemen is necessarily higher than the monopsony price
(pd > pm) for any d > 0, with pd = pm for d = 0. The quantity purchased
under upstream duopsony is given by:
qd =
P   d
2
; (14)
resulting in an equilibrium prot for the exporter (in dealing with each
middleman) given by:
d =
1
4
(P   d)2 : (15)
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Note that in case of upstream duopsony, the exporters prots are falling
in the level of transportation costs, since what it pays the middlemen goes
up, and quantity supplied by the middlemen goes down. Using (13) in (3),
a middlemans prots in this case are:
d =
1
2
d(P   d) (16)
Figure 3 illustrates the optimal pricing decisions in the form of a game
tree.
Figure 2: Game tree
Note that only "monopsony payo¤s 1" and "duopsony payo¤s 1" are rel-
evant equilibria: If the exporter observes that, based on the transportation
costs, a given price o¤er p to the middlemen would lead to duopsony competi-
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tion dening the price o¤ered by them to the farmers, i.e., wd, then we know
the exporter will choose pd. Hence, "Monopsony payo¤s 2" cannot apply.
Similarly, if the exporter observes that a given price p results in monopsony
dening the upstream purchasing price, i.e., wm, then the exporters optimal
choice is pm. Hence, "duopsony 2" cannot apply.
Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium prices and prots for the three types
of agents under the two types of market structures at the middleman level,
monopsony (given by "monopsony payo¤s 1 in Figure 3) or duopsony (given
by "duopsony payo¤s 1" in Figure 3).
Table 1: Overview over prices and prots
Middlemen monopsony Middlemen duopsony
Price middleman : pm = 1
2
P Price middleman: pd = P+d
2
Price farmer: wm = 1
4
P Price farmer: wd = P d
2
Prot exporter: m = 1
8
P 2 Prot exporter: d = 1
4
(P   d)2
Prot middleman: m = 1
16
P 2 Prot middleman: d = 1
2
d(P   d)
2.3 Analysis: Strategic pricing by exporter
We have seen that the middlemens incentive to compete is a¤ected by the
purchasing price o¤ered by the exporter. Hence, the exporter may a¤ect the
upstream market structure by setting either a high price to induce competi-
tion, or a low price to prevent competition. When is the exporter willing and
able to a¤ect the market structure by such strategic pricing? To answer this
question, we have to dene the parameter space for which the middlemens
choice of market structure is actually a¤ected by whether the exporter o¤ers
the low price pm or the higher price pd.
First of all, recall that there is duopsony in the upstream market as long
as d < d = p=2. Observe that d is a function of p, the price o¤ered by the
exporter. If the exporter o¤ers pd = (P + d) =2, this implies that competition
takes place for d < pd=2. Using (13) the critical level of transportation costs
below which there is competition can be expressed as:
d = P=3  d2: (17)
Similarly, if the exporter were to o¤er the lower price pm = P=2, there
is autarky for d > pm=2 . Using (9) the critical level of transportation costs
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above which there is no competition can be expressed as:
d = P=4  d1: (18)
Hence, in the interval d 2 [d1; d2] the upstream equilibrium is a¤ected by
the pricing choice of the exporter: O¤ering the middlemen the higher price
pd results in competition, o¤ering the lower price pm results in monopsony.
We can identify the critical level of trade costs, as a function of the
international price P , for which the exporter is indi¤erent between o¤ering
the higher price pd or the lower price pm from the condition m = d, which
using (11) and (15) can be expressed as:
d =
Pp
2 + 2
= 0:292 89P (19)
We observe that d1 < d < d2. For d 2 (d1; d), the exporter strategi-
cally chooses the higher price o¤er pd, whereas for d 2 (d; d2), it strategically
chooses the lower price pm. Hence, we can conclude that:
Proposition 1 When local transportation costs are low relative to the in-
ternational price, i.e., for d 2 (d1; d), the exporter strategically sets a high
price in order to promote upstream competition. When local transportation
costs are high relative to the international price, i.e., for d 2 (d; d2), the
exporter strategically sets a low price in order to avoid upstream competition.
The intuition for this result is that when transportation costs are high
relative to the international price, i.e., for d 2 (d; d2), the exporter wishes
to avoid these costs. It does so by o¤ering the lower monopoly price pm,
causing monopsony pricing by the middlemen, wm. The cost to the exporter,
of course, is that supply goes down, but when the international price is low,
that matters less. In contrast, when transportation costs are low relative to
the international price, i.e., for d 2 (d1; d), the exporter o¤ers the higher
price pd, resulting in upstream duopsony pricing, wm. The higher price it
pays to the middlemen can be defended since the world market price is also
high.
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium price paid by exporter to middlemen
and the price middlemen pay to farmers as a function of transportation costs
d, for a given international price (P = 1).
There are several interesting observations to make. First:
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Figure 3: Transportation costs and equilibrium purchasing prices
Proposition 2 There is a discontinuity in the prices at a critical level of
transportation cost, d.
For d > d2, there is upstream monopsony, and prices do not depend on
transportation cost: The exporter o¤ers half of the international price to the
middlemen (pm = P=2) and the middlemen o¤er half of the price that the
exporter gives them to the farmers (wm = p=2). This resembles the double
marginalization result in the literature on vertical restraints. A reduction in
transportation costs at d2 leads to a discrete increase in purchasing prices on
both levels. The exporter strategically chooses a high price so as to induce
competition between the middlemen, which translates into a higher price
to the farmers, which in turn leads to higher supplies of co¤ee. As argued
above, this is the optimal strategy for the exporter since transportation costs
relative to the international price are relatively low. Second:
Proposition 3 A drop in transportation costs for d < d2 leads to opposite
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price movements upstream and downstream.
For the middlemen, lower transportation costs intensify competition, lead-
ing to an increase in their price o¤er to the farmers. Hence, wd increases as
d falls. Intensied competition upstream allows the exporter downstream
to o¤er the middlemen a lower price while still maintaining a satisfactory
supply of co¤ee. Indeed, as discussed above and illustrated also in Figure 2,
for d = 0 middlemen prots are zero, and the farmers receive a price which
is half the international price. Farmers incomes therefore rise with a fall
in transportation costs, with a discrete increase taking place at the critical
trade cost d2.
3 Concluding remarks
The supply chain of co¤ee from producer to consumer is typically complex,
involving agents with market power at di¤erent levels of the chain. The
present paper has analyzed a setting with market power at two levels, up-
stream where middlemen purchase co¤ee from producers and downstream
where the exporter purchases from the middlemen. We have demonstrated
that the exporter in this setting may have interest in behaving strategically
in its price setting. The exporters prot depends on whether the middlemen
compete or not. This in turn depends on local transportation costs and the
price middlemen receive from the exporter. When local transportations costs
are relatively high, the exporter may have an incentive to o¤er a low price to
the middlemen in order to avoid competition and thereby avoid transporta-
tion costs inating the price in the supply chain. When local transportation
costs are relatively low, on the other hand, the exporter may have an incen-
tive to o¤er a higher price to the middlemen in order to promote competition,
and thereby secure larger supplies of co¤ee.
Interestingly, we have shown that purchasing prices are discontinuous in
the local transportation costs. Moreover, for low transportation costs, a
further reduction in these costs leads to opposite price movements for farm-
ers and middlemen. In particular, while the price o¤ered to the middlemen
declines, the price they have to pay to the farmers increases. These oppos-
ing price movements reect the weaker market power of the middlemen as
transportation costs fall.
Our paper is based on a very simplistic view of the relationships in the
vertical supply chain. In particular, the parties deal only in one product,
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and use only linear pricing contracts. This modelling strategy has allowed
us to focus on the issue of strategic pricing with maximum clarity. However,
we know from the literature that rural markets in developing countries are
often characterized by di¤erent types of interlinkages between purchasers
and sellers (see for example Basu, 1984 and Platteau and Abraham, 1987).
Moreover, more complex contracts, such as non linear contracts, would be a
method for the exporters to extract rents from middlemen. We leave these
interesting extensions for future research.
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Abstract 
Imperfect competition among purchasers of coffee is a common problem for small 
scale producers. Theoretically, producer-owned marketing co-operatives can reduce 
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1. Introduction 
Imperfect competition in agricultural markets is a widespread problem, particularly in 
developing countries (Lopez and You 1992, Key and Runsten 1999, Osborne 2005, 
Markelova et al 2009). Monopsonistic pricing has negative consequences for poor, 
smallholder producers. It has been claimed that agricultural co-operatives in developing 
countries may reduce the market power of purchasers, and thereby move prices closer to a 
competitive level (Deininger 1995). The purpose of this study is to investigate if the Fairtrade 
and organically certified co-operatives in Chiapas, Mexico have this effect. This will be done 
through theoretical modelling, qualitative evidence from field work and statistical analysis. 
Agricultural co-operatives are farmer-owned organisations, democratically organised 
on the one member one vote principle. The farmers sell their produce through a co-operative 
and the profits from processing and resale are shared between them, usually according to 
quantities delivered. Co-operatives can be seen as vertically integrated firms, where the small 
units (the farmers) own the large unit (the processing firm) (Tennbakk 1996, Bergman 1997). 
Because co-operatives have a different organisational structure and perhaps different 
objectives than private firms, it can be expected that market interaction involving co-
operatives will yield different outcomes than interaction among private firms. In particular, 
the entry of a marketing co-operative in a local market dominated by a limited number of 
private purchasers may have a stronger pro-competitive effect than the entry of another 
private purchaser. 
The structure of agricultural purchasing markets makes them prone to market failure. 
Farmers’ investments in sunk assets represent exit barriers and cause product supply to be 
inelastic. Combined with high transport costs and buyer concentration in local product 
markets, this creates favourable conditions for the exercise of monopsony power (Sexton and 
Lavoie 2001). Agricultural co-operatives have often been formed as a response to this type of 
market failure (Rhodes 1983, Fulton 2004, Le Vay 1983, Hansmann 1996). According to 
Taylor (1971), who bases his analysis on the theories of Enke (1945), it is most beneficial for 
the co-operative and its members to offer prices that are at the competitive level. Co-
operatives may then have a competitive yardstick effect, a term coined by Nourse in 1944. He 
claimed that co-operatives can, solely by virtue of their presence in the market, force private 
purchasers into behaving more competitively (Nourse 1944). This means that co-operatives 
will not only have an impact on their members, but they will also improve prices received by 
non-members. Up until the present, most studies of the ‘yardstick hypothesis’ are based on 
theoretical modelling (Helmberger 1964, Cotterill 1987, Sexton 1990, Tennbakk 1996). An 
empirical study of the market for food manufacturing in the US finds support for the 
‘yardstick hypothesis’ (Petraglia and Rogers 1994), but there are very few studies of the 
potentially pro-competitive effect of co-operatives in developing countries. Over the last 100 
years, the market power of middlemen has declined in the industrialised countries, which 
today has modern antitrust policies (Hansmann 1996). But the situation is different in 
developing countries, where market failure is said to be one of the most important reasons 
why group formation takes place (Thorp et al. 2005). Farmers in these markets typically do 
not have easy access to markets and information, and therefore to a large extent depend on 
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middlemen. Agricultural co-operatives can therefore reasonably be expected to have a pro-
competitive effect.   
Co-operatives have often been promoted in developing countries, but in many cases 
they have ended up as failures, neither leading to economic development nor political 
empowerment of the poor (Attwood and Baviskar 1988). The reason for failure has often been 
lack of real participation by members in these often externally initiated co-operatives (Hyden 
1988). However, a type of co-operative that has been successful in many developing 
countries, are the ones that are part of sustainable labelling schemes, such as Fairtrade and 
organic (Renard 1996, Ruerd 2008). A theoretical study by Hayes (2006) on the impact of 
Fairtrade concludes that it strengthens competition for labour and eliminates monopsony 
rents, an effect similar to the ‘yardstick effect’ of co-operatives.  
This paper looks at the local markets for coffee purchasing in Chiapas, Mexico. The 
first part of the paper is a qualitative study of the situation in the coffee markets in Chiapas. 
This study provides an insight into how the coffee purchasers operate and the competition 
enhancing effect that some stakeholders claim that the co-operatives have. Results from a 
small survey among representatives from organic co-operatives in Chiapas are also presented. 
This is followed by a theoretical modelling of the ‘yardstick hypothesis’. The last part is a 
statistical analysis of data on coffee prices at municipality level in Chiapas and presence of 
Fairtrade and organically labelled co-operatives. All three studies indicate that the presence of 
co-operatives often, but not always, have a positive effect on coffee prices paid to non-
members.  
 
2. The pro-competitive effect of co-operatives in Chiapas: 
Qualitative evidence 
 
Coffee in Chiapas: Background 
Coffee is one of the world’s most traded commodities. It is also a tropical commodity, which 
is produced in the South and generally consumed in the North. Because there are no 
economies of scale in the initial production and processing stage, coffee is still mainly 
produced by smallholder farmers. This is also characteristic of other tropical commodities 
such as cocoa, while plantations are more common in the tea sector since it has economies of 
scale at the initial stage of processing (Talbot 2002). Whether smallholder producers are 
organised in co-operatives or not often depends on political or social aspects related to 
historic events. In some countries such as Vietnam, the second largest coffee producer in the 
world, there are hardly any coffee co-operatives, while in countries like Mexico, Nicaragua 
and Colombia they are widespread.  According to Fox (1996), social capital is an important 
factor for the establishing of organisations and civil society, and the conditions in Mexico 
have been favourable for civil-society building, partly because of external allies.  
In Mexico 99% of coffee producers are small scale farmers with less than 10 ha 
(Giovannucci and Juarez 2006). Chiapas is the main coffee producing state. In Chiapas in 
2005 coffee was produced on more than 240 000 ha, which is approximately 35% of the total 
coffee land area in Mexico (SAGARPA 2005). Coffee production takes place in 74% of the 
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municipalities by 174 690 coffee producers (SAGARPA 2005), which is 4% of the total 
population in Chiapas (INEGI 2007). Chiapas is also one of the poorest states in Mexico, and 
85% of the coffee producers have less than 2 ha, which is barely enough for making a living 
(Barrera et al. 2004). Furthermore there are few employment opportunities in rural areas 
(Lopez 2007). Many small scale coffee producers receive financial support from government 
run programmes such as Oportunidades and Procampo. One of the problems for coffee 
producers is the strong fluctuations in international coffee prices, which destabilise their 
household income. Since 2001 another government program has been implemented, the 
stabilisation fund (Fondo de Estabilisación). The purpose of this fund is to stabilise coffee 
prices by collecting money from coffee farmers in years where coffee prices are high, and 
repay them a premium when the prices are low. 
 
Coffee prices in Chiapas 2001-2007 
The graph below shows the development of coffee prices at the farm gate in Chiapas and at 
the international coffee stock markets in the period 2001-2007. At the beginning of the period, 
in 2001, prices were at a record low. In Chiapas the average price was 400 pesos per quintal 
(57.5 kg) dried parchment, or approximately 50 US cents per kilo. From 2002 there is a 
recovery from the crisis, with a particularly strong price increase in 2004. In 2005, the coffee 
price in Chiapas has almost tripled compared to 2001. This price level seems to maintain itself 
over the next two years. On average, over the whole period, the local prices are approximately 
80% of the international prices. The variation in prices in the period 2001-2007 is illustrated 
in the graph below. 
 
Graph 1: World market and Chiapas farm gate coffee prices 
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Note: ICO (International coffee Organisation) indicator price for Other Mild Arabica Group (Mexican pesos per 
45. 36 kilo (100 lb) green coffee), and average coffee prices paid to non co-operative members in Chiapas 
(Mexican pesos per 57,5 kilo (1 quintal) dried parchment coffee)2.  
Source: ICO (2007) and SPC (2007) (for further description see section 4) 
 
The table below shows the monthly averages across municipalities and at the international 
level, for the period 2001-2007, and the average difference between the two price levels.  
Table 1: Summary statistics average per month world market and Chiapas farm gate 
coffee prices, in Mexican pesos per quintal 
 
Variable description 
Obs Mean Std 
Dev 
Min Max 
Average price at municipality level in period 2001-2007 66 749 285 397 1265
Average international price for Arabica coffee 2001-2007 66 940 301 520 1508
Average difference between local  price and international 
price 
66 -191 65 -318 88
Source: ICO (2007) and SPC (2007) (for further description see section 4) 
 
Coffee co-operatives and labelling systems in Chiapas 
The history of coffee co-operatives in Chiapas goes back to the era of the International Coffee 
Agreement (ICA), when the governmental institution Inmecafé (Instituto Mexicano del Café) 
was buying coffee in Mexico in order to regulate supply (Nolasco 1985 p. 230). At the time 
small scale farmers sold their coffee to private purchasers, or intermediaries, who often were 
also owners of large coffee plantations. Inmecafé realised that although they were offering 
better prices than the intermediaries, the farmers could not sell their coffee to them as long as 
they depended on the credit that they received from the intermediaries. Inmecafé therefore 
started a campaign to organise farmers into a special type of co-operatives called UEPCs 
(Uniones Económicas de Producción de Café). These organisations received economic 
support from Inmecafé, and offered the farmers prepayment for their harvest, thus making 
them independent from the intermediaries. In the early 80s, Inmecafé controlled more than 
two thirds of the Mexican producers, organised in more than 3228 UEPCs (Renard 1996 p. 
267). According to Nolasco, ‘the purchasing price established by the institute was soon 
converted into a minimum in many regions, and the private purchasers had to augment their 
purchasing prices in order to obtain more coffee’3 (Nolasco 1985 p.233, my translation). This 
indicates that the UEPC co-operatives had a ‘competitive yardstick effect’. 
When the ICA was dismantled in 1989 Inmecafé was closed, and coffee co-operatives 
had no one to sell their coffee to other than the multinational companies who soon after 
moved into the market. Without finance, and in many cases without a strong commitment 
among the members (Parra and Moguel 1998), most of the organisations disappeared. But in 
                                                 
2 1 quintal dried parchment coffee=100 lb green coffee 
3 ‘El precio de compra establecido por el Instituto pronto se convirtió en el mínimo en muchas regiones, y los 
compradores privados tuvieron que aumentar sus precios de adquisición para obtener más grano.’ 
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the early 1990s a new opportunity for reaching the export market materialised: through the 
fair trade and the organic labelling system. 
The world’s first Fairtrade certified co-operative was UCIRI, based in Oaxaca, 
Mexico, who established the labelling system in 1988. In 2006 there were 38 Fairtrade 
certified coffee co-operatives in Mexico, with more than 20 000 members (FLO 2006). The 
main criteria for Fairtrade certification are that the majority of members are small producers, 
that the organisation is democratic and transparent, able to export coffee and environmentally 
concerned. Co-operatives that sell Fairtrade labelled coffee are paid the Fairtrade minimum 
price, which is 121 US cents/lb, or 2.78 USD/kilo. In addition there is a premium of 10 US 
cents/lb4.  
In 2006 all the Mexican Fairtrade co-operatives were also organically certified. But 
there are many organic co-operatives that are not Fairtrade certified. In Mexico there has been 
an exceptional growth in organic cultivation the last ten years. Chiapas is Mexico’s most 
important producer of organic coffee, with more than half of the organic coffee land situated 
here (Gomez Cruz et al 2005). Coffee sold as organically certified generates a premium of 
between 10 and 20 US cents/lb. In Chiapas in 2007 there were 174 organic coffee co-
operatives (SNIDRUS 2007). There are also an unknown number of co-operatives in Chiapas 
that are not certified, but to my knowledge none of these are exporting coffee directly today.  
The majority of coffee producers in Chiapas are not members of co-operatives despite 
their generally better price offers. The field study shows that the majority of the Fairtrade co-
operatives are open to new members who agree to follow requirements for organic production 
and participate in co-operative meetings. In some co-operatives new members have to pay an 
entrance fee. In return they are paid a price which is usually higher than the one for 
conventional coffee paid by private purchasers, depending on whether or not the co-operative 
has sold the coffee under Fairtrade and organic conditions, and on the level of the 
international conventional prices. However, the co-operatives do not always pay the members 
at the moment they deliver their coffee, since they rarely have enough working capital and 
therefore have to wait for the payment from importers.  
The structure of the coffee market in Chiapas can be described as follows: When the 
coffee has been harvested, pulped, fermented and dried5, the small scale producers who are 
not organised in a co-operative have in general two main sales options: They can either sell it 
to the local intermediaries who come to the village with their pick-up trucks, or they can 
transport it themselves to a small town such as the municipality centre, where there are larger 
purchasers with warehouses for coffee storing. The price the producers obtain in the 
municipality centres are slightly better than what they receive from the local village level 
intermediary, but then they also have to cover transport costs. The intermediary in the 
municipality centre is in some cases a subsidiary of a transnational company (TNC), or he or 
she has an agreement with such a company. This intermediary transports the coffee to a larger 
city centre such as Tuxtla and Tapachula where it is delivered to the TNC processing plant. 
                                                 
4 Until June 2007, the premium was 5 US cents/lb. 
5 In southern Chiapas it is also common for farmers to sell their coffee as unprocessed cherry. 
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During processing the thin parchment around the bean is removed, and the green coffee that 
remains is exported by the TNC.  
Hence, Chiapas is a region with many cases of mixed markets with a presence of both 
co-operatives and coffee purchasing private purchasers. It thus provides an interesting setting 
for investigating if co-operatives have a pro-competitive effect. 
 
Market concentration 
Entering the coffee exporting business is not easy. In order to export profitably, it is necessary 
to have knowledge about the functioning of the market, export procedures and the 
bureaucracy, and one needs to establish contact with a trustworthy international trader who 
also trusts the exporter. All of this implies considerable sunk costs. Financial capital is also 
very important since it can take several months from the time the coffee is sent to the payment 
from the trader arrives. In the processing and export processes there are economies of scale, 
exporting only small amounts of coffee is not profitable. Entry barriers are probably a main 
reason for an increased market concentration in the coffee exporting sector. Over the last 15–
20 years there has been a tendency worldwide of merging among exporting coffee companies. 
In most coffee producing countries today there are just a few TNCs dominating the market 
(Talbot 2004, Daviron and Ponte 2005 
There are also barriers to entry at the lower level of the coffee chain, the level of the 
intermediaries who buy coffee directly from the farmers and sell it to the TNC 
processor/exporter. In order to become an intermediary coffee purchaser it is necessary to 
have a pick-up truck to load the coffee on, to have access to capital, and to have the skills to 
organize a group of suppliers. Producers will often tend to sell to the same local intermediary 
every year, and the local intermediaries will sell to the same transnational exporter. In order to 
obtain a loan from the exporter a long term, trusting relationship between the two parties 
needs to be built up. Hence, the local coffee markets in Chiapas is one where, in order to start 
up a business as a coffee trader, it is important to have initial contacts with both producers and 
buyers further up the chain. 
  
Market failure  
The fact that there are few coffee purchasers in Chiapas makes it possible for these purchasers 
to exert market power. The isolation of producers enhances this opportunity. Small scale 
coffee farmers in Chiapas live in rural, often isolated areas where infrastructure is scarce. Even 
when the roads are good, very few have their own vehicles and therefore the costs of bringing 
their coffee elsewhere to sell are high. They are therefore more prone to accept the prices 
offered by the intermediaries who come to the villages. According to Perez Grovas et al. 
(2002), coffee purchasers pay less to producers who live in remote villages. Interviews 
conducted by this author in Chiapas with government officials, coffee purchasers, researchers 
and cooperative members and staff reveal a belief that intermediaries in some regions are 
considered to be ‘territorial’, meaning that they have divided the different villages between 
them, and do not go into each other’s areas to buy coffee. Therefore they can buy at a lower 
price than the competitive one.  
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“They (the intermediaries) divide themselves into zones, each one corresponds to each 
of the big chains.”6  
Co-operative advisor, Los Altos 
 
In this situation producers have to accept the price imposed by the intermediary, or the sales 
transaction will not take place (Gonzalez 2006 p.220). The problem is not only that the coffee 
producers have few other options for selling their coffee. There are also few other income 
generating crops that they may cultivate, and few other work opportunities. What many opt 
for is migration, either to larger cities in Mexico, or illegal migration to the United States 
(Martínez and Ordoñez 1998). But these are risky strategies which often involve trauma both 
for the migrant and his or her family who is left behind. This means that the coffee producers 
in many ways are locked into a situation that it is difficult to get out of. 
Also the volatility in coffee prices makes it possible for the intermediaries to underpay 
the producers. This makes coffee producers uncertain about the value of their coffee. An 
interviewed producer from Los Altos explained that if the producers in his village did not 
accept the price offered, the intermediary would threaten that it would soon go even further 
down, in order to make the producers sell. This means that the intermediary pretends to be 
able to predict market development. In other cases they may take advantage of the markets 
unpredictability to get more producers to accept a lower price: 
 
‘The coyotes (…) say: ‘Tiemenlonla (the co-operative) is paying 18. I will pay you 20’. 
And so on. At 8 o’clock he says 20. But at 9 when they come with their coffee: ‘The 
New York coffee stock market went down!’. (…) Nevertheless the rumours remain that 
the coyote so-and-so is paying 20. And so on and so on…’7 
Co-operative advisor, Selva region 
 
The advantage for the intermediaries is the producers’ lack of knowledge. Chiapas has the 
lowest average years of schooling in Mexico, and the highest rate of illiteracy (INEGI 2007). 
Without reading skills it becomes more difficult to obtain information about the price 
development for coffee8. Also, in Chiapas the majority of the coffee producers are people of 
indigenous origins (Barrera et al. 2004). Indigenous people are prone to discrimination 
(Nolasco 1985 p. 336), and are often in a vulnerable position when it comes to negotiations 
because they do not speak Spanish. This means that indigenous coffee producers are more 
likely to receive lower prices than producers of mixed origin (meztisos). 
                                                 
6 ‘Se reparten por zona, uno corresponde por cada uno de los grandes cadenas.  
7 Los coyotes (…) dicen: ‘Tiemenlonla esta pagando a 18. Yo le voy a pagar 20’. Ahí van. A las 8 de la mañana dice que a 
20. Pero a las 9 vienen con su café. ‘Ya bajó la bolsa de Nueva York’. (…) Sin embargo queda la noticia que en tal parte el 
coyote Fulano esta pagando a 20. Ahí van ahí van… 
8 According to a still unpublished household survey in Chiapas, described in chapter 4 in this thesis, in the area 
with few co-operatives (Cacahuatán), most producers found out about coffee prices through the intermediaries, 
the second most quoted source was neighbors. Very few producers informed themselves about coffee prices 
through the media. 
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Another characteristic of coffee production which creates opportunities to exercise 
market power is the producers need for credit. Coffee harvest takes place only once a year, 
and very often it is the only source of cash income for rural families. It is often difficult for 
the coffee farmers to make the income from one harvest last until the next. Traditionally, 
therefore, the coffee farmers have been dependent on credit, for the maintenance of their 
families as well as for financing the harvest when many of them need to hire workers 
(Martinez and Ordoñez 1998). In some cases they also need to borrow because of a crisis 
situation such as illnesses or accidents. The only credit option available to the majority of the 
coffee producers in Chiapas has been the private coffee purchasers, who lend money to the 
producer on the condition that he or she must later sell their coffee harvest to him, at the price 
decided by the purchaser (Nolasco 1985, Martinez 1997 p.30). This is an opportunity for the 
intermediaries to underpay the producers. If they do not accept the price, they know that it 
will be difficult to borrow another time, which means that they are not insured against crisis 
situations. This interlinked market setting is typical for isolated rural economies in developing 
countries, and similar situations have been analysed by for instance Basu (1983) and Platteau 
and Abraham (1987). 
 
Cheating on weight and quality 
There seems to be a general belief in Chiapas that intermediaries underpay producers by 
several different methods. A much cited example is that the intermediaries use false weights.  
 
“Unfortunately, the business has been damaged to such an extent that there are 
people who come to buy from the producer and they see him and, ‘here comes 
someone to buy the coffee!’ This person arrives, weighs with these steelyards that they 
call machete, and they put the bag on, and they measure with the eye…and if the bag 
weighs 60 kilos they say that it weights 50. And since people do not weigh their coffee 
‘Oh, 50, yes, take it with you’. And from this they took off 10 kilos. (…) It’s a 
problem.”9 
Manager from coffee purchasing TNC, Los Altos 
 
In the Soconusco area where they sometimes sell coffee without drying it, the intermediaries 
buy cherry coffee in used oil cans. Several interviewed stakeholders claimed that some 
intermediaries make the cans larger than the standard size, and hence more coffee fits in 
without the producers’ knowledge.  
When negotiating about the price of the coffee, the quality is an important issue. 
Ideally the coffee should be clean, without any leftover fruit skin (called ‘chibola’), no spots 
or damaged beans, and it should not be wet. For any of these faults, a discount is made, either 
in pesos per kilo, or a certain number of kilos is deducted from the total weight. One way to 
cheat the producers is to claim that the quality of the producer’s coffee is lower than what it is 
                                                 
9 Desgraciadamente, se ha dañado tanto el negocio que hay gente que llega a comprar al productor, y lo ve y ‘ahí viene fulano 
que lo lleva’. Llega la persona este, pesa con las romanas que se llama machete, y ponen el bulto y ellos manejan a su antojo 
la …si el bulto pesa 60 kilos dicen que pesa 50. Y como la gente no pesa su café ‘ah 50 sí, llevatelo’. Y de ahí le quito 10 
kilos. (…) Es una problemática. 
10 
in reality, and thus demand too much discount. If the producer has few other options, he will 
have to accept.  
 
“The coyote tell them: ‘I’ll pay you 15 pesos’. But when the bag arrives...: ‘No, a bad 
coffee, very low quality, look! And so even though our members know when the quality 
is bad, say it is so and so much black, spotted, broken, so even if it does not have 
anything of that and is very good, but they cannot say anything because they want it to 
be bought, right? ‘I’ll pay you 15 pesos, but it is very bad, so 13 if you’d like. And if 
not take it back with you.’ The member won’t take his bag that already cost him the 
transport it cost him to bring it. Do you think he’ll take it back home with him? To 
bring it back again to sell?”10 
Co-operative advisor, Selva region 
 
Co-operatives and private purchasers 
The qualitative interviews in Chiapas revealed that many believe co-operatives have had an 
impact on the behaviour of the private intermediaries, or coyotes. One co-operative manager 
and producer made the following description of what had happened in his village: 
 
“In the village the coyotes (intermediaries) are coming to buy coffee. Before, since 
there weren’t many co-operatives, they were paying a very low price. But now that 
many co-operatives have increased, well there are many co-operatives in Chenaló, 
there are about three or four co-operatives, and now the coyotes, not any more, the 
coyotes don’t find much coffee. Because of that now the price is going up too. Well, 
supposedly there is competition between the co-operatives and the coyotes11”. 
Co-operative manager and coffee producer, Los Altos 
 
Another piece of evidence of the co-operatives’ influence is the often observed difference in 
prices offered by intermediaries before and after the co-operatives open their bodegas in the 
region. A functionary from the public coffee organisation COMCAFE, who previously had 
worked as a intermediary coffee buyer, said the co-operatives worked as ‘thermometers’, and 
that prices always were higher when their bodegas were open compared to when they were 
                                                 
10 El coyote les dice ‘te lo voy a pagar a 15 pesos.’ Pero llegando el bulto…’no, un café muy malo, muy baja calidad, mira!’ 
Entonces aunque el socio de nosotros sabe cuando es baja calidad, o sea tiene tantos negros, tanto manchado, quebrados, 
entonces si no tiene nada de eso y esta bonísima, pero no puede decir nada, porque, que se lo compre verdad. ‘Te voy a pagar 
15 pesos pero es muy malo, entonces a 13 si quieres. Y si no llevate el.’ El socio no va a coger su bulto que ya le costó el 
flete, ya le costó traerle. Tu piensas que va le traer a su casa? Para volver lo traer a vender?  
 
11 Como siempre en la comunidad pasan los coyotajes, intermediarios para comprar café. Y siempre anteriormente como no 
había muchas cooperativas, pagaban muy bajo precio. Pero hasta horita como ya aumentó muchas cooperativas, bueno hay 
muchas cooperativas en Chenaló, hay como unas tres o cuatro cooperativas, y ya los coyotajes, ya no, los coyotes no 
encuentran mucho café. Por eso ya como el precio se leve también. Bueno, supuestamente hay una competencia de las 
cooperativas y coyotajes. 
11 
closed. A co-operative manager and advisor, who is also a scholar in agronomy, described the 
effect in the following manner: 
 
“In one region, in a study that we made, when the intermediary begins to go through 
the villages in our zone, they may be paying for instance 10 pesos (approx 1 USD). We 
open our bodega and set the price to 15 pesos. We are not only operating with these 
15 pesos as the price that our members receive. This turns into the regional price. 
What Majomut is paying becomes the regional reference. So the day after we have 
opened our bodega, we start collecting coffee, the price that we have set becomes the 
reference for the whole region. The day before those who sell to the intermediary 
receive 10 pesos, the day when we open the intermediary is at 15 pesos, or 14.50, a 
price very close to our reference. We close the bodega Friday the 15th of April, and 
Saturday the price is again at 10 pesos. An example. The co-operative not only has an 
influence on its members, but it is also a regional reference to fix the price12”. 
Co-operative advisor 
 
People interviewed were also asked if they believed the co-operatives had an influence on the 
intermediaries’ tendency to cheat on weight and quality. One interviewed co-operative 
manager explained that since the intermediaries had problems finding enough coffee to buy, 
they had to weigh and pay justly in order to gain confidence with the producers. 
Hence, the private intermediaries seem to be under the treat that if they pay low prices 
or cheat the non members on weight or quality, they will join the co-operative. The 
intermediaries will then lose market shares unless they pay a better price or stop cheating. On 
the other hand, the private purchasers possibly also increase their price in order to buy coffee 
from members of the co-operatives. This could be a long term strategy to destabilise the co-
operative and get rid of the ‘yardstick effect’, so-called ‘predatory pricing’ (Fulton 1999). 
Stories told during interviews reveal that intermediaries seem to have followed this strategy in 
several places in Chiapas.  
 Another way that the co-operatives can influence price levels is by increasing the level 
of information and knowledge among coffee producers in general. Co-operatives often 
arrange meetings and courses on different issues related to coffee production and sales. This 
education of members could have a spill-over effect on non members who also become more 
informed and thereby better negotiators. The result could be that price levels increase in areas 
with co-operatives13. 
                                                 
12 En una región, en un estudio que nosotros hemos hecho, cuando el intermediario empieza a recoger las comunidades en 
nuestra zona, pueden estar pagando, por ejemplo 10 pesos. Nosotros abrimos nuestra bodega, y fijamos el precio a 15 pesos. 
Nosotros no solamente actuamos con estos 15 pesos sobre el precio que reciben nuestros socios. Eso se convierte en el precio 
regional. Lo que paga Majomut se convierte en la referencia regional. Entonces al día siguiente que nosotros abrimos nuestra 
bodega, empezamos acopiar el café, el precio que fijamos nosotros se convierte en el referente de toda la región. El día 
anterior pueden recibir los que entregan café al intermediario 10 pesos, y el día que nosotros abrimos el intermediario está a 
15 pesos, o 14,50, un precio muy cercano a nuestro referente. …cerramos la bodega el viernes 15 de abril, el sábado el precio 
es otra vez a 10 pesos. Un ejemplo. La cooperativa no solo tiene una influencia sobre sus socios, sino es una referente regional 
para fijar el precio.  
13 According to the earlier mentioned unpublished household survey from Chiapas, in the area where there was a 
stronger co-operative presence (Jitotol), most producers found out about prices through the co-operative. 
12 
 
Survey results organic co-operatives 
In May 2007, representatives from all the organic co-operatives in Chiapas that were certified 
by the Mexican certifier organisation Certimex participated in workshops on how to perform 
internal control of their members’ production methods. One workshop was held in San 
Cristobal, the other in Tuxtla. The representatives, one or two from each organisation, were 
mostly part of the technical staff, and all of them spoke Spanish and were able to read and 
write. A questionnaire was filled in by the participants14.  Among other things, the co-
operative representatives were asked if they thought the price offered by the intermediaries 
was higher after the co-operative came to the area, and when the warehouse of the co-
operative was open. They were also asked if they believed the intermediaries cheated the 
producers less after the co-operative was established in the region. Only one co-operative said 
‘no’ to all these 3 questions, and only 5 did not believe they had any influence on the 
intermediaries’ cheating behaviour. Some of the co-operatives asked in the survey said the 
intermediaries offered 1–2 pesos per kilo, or 150 pesos per quintal more when the co-
operative opened the warehouse for coffee deliveries. The survey shows that the majority of 
the co-operatives believe they have an impact on the intermediaries’ behaviour, and 
particularly on their tendency to cheat the producers. But it also shows that almost half (45%) 
of the co-operatives did not think they had influenced the price of the intermediaries. Some of 
the co-operatives are more than 20 years old, so it is difficult for them to evaluate the before 
and after effect of their presence. Nevertheless the survey indicates that some co-operative 
members have the impression that their co-operatives do not have a competitive effect on the 
local coffee price. 
 
Table 2: Survey results 38 organic co-operatives (19 also Fairtrade certified) 
 Yes No Do not know/Not 
answered 
Did prices go up after coop came to area? 50% 45% 5%
Do prices go up when the coop warehouse opens? 42% 29% 29%
Does the coyote cheat less after coop came to area? 74% 16% 10%
Did the coop receive external help when formed? 66% 24% 10%
 
                                                 
14 36 representatives responded at the workshops, later 2 other co-operatives filled in the questionnaire during an 
interview. 
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3. Modelling the ‘competitive yardstick effect’ 
We have just seen that there is some qualitative evidence that coffee co-operatives in Chiapas 
have a pro-competitive effect on prices offered by local intermediary purchasers. What 
follows is a theoretical model explaining how this effect could work. 
 
Co-operatives: A literature overview 
In this model, farmers can sell their coffee either to a co-operative or to a private, profit 
maximizing purchaser. The farmers own the co-operative and use it for marketing their 
product. Decisions are made according to the ‘one member one vote’ principle, and the 
surplus that the co-operative generates is distributed to the members according to the 
quantities that they have sold to the co-operative (Le Vay 1983).  
The profit maximising objective of private purchasers implies that if they are able to 
exercise monopsony power they will pay the farmers a lower price in order to increase their 
market margins. The co-operative, on the other hand, will retain market margins and 
distribute it to the members. Since the surplus is distributed according to quantities delivered 
the price the co-operative pays will be higher than the private purchaser monopsony price 
(Helmberger 1964, Taylor 1971, Le Vay 1983). When a co-operative is formed in an area and 
pays a higher price than a previously monopsonist private purchaser, it may have a pro-
competitive effect, which means that it will push a private purchaser in the same market 
towards more competitive pricing. As a result the farmers outside the co-operative will also be 
better off, even though they are not selling to the co-operative.  
Exactly how the pro-competitive effect comes about depends on whether or not the co-
operative is open to new members. An open co-operative will increase production and price to 
the competitive outcome and make rival private purchasers increase their price to the same 
level (Helmberger 1964, Cotterill 1987, p.211). But if the co-operative is closed to new 
members, the result could be that non members are offered monopsonist prices from the 
private purchaser (Tennbakk 1996). However, this can be prevented if the closed co-operative 
plays the role of a ‘barometer of exploitation’ (Helmberger 1964), or a ‘pacemaker’ (LeVay 
1983). This means that a large difference between the co-operative and the private price could 
push non members to take measures such as to form another co-operative or seek government 
intervention to redress the situation, a possibility that ‘might lead profit seeking firms to 
temper their use of power with prudence’ (Helmerger 1964). 
The competitive yardstick effect has been studied theoretically in the context of 
agricultural markets by, among others, Helmberger (1964), Taylor (1971), Cotterill (1987) 
and Sexton (1990). The model used here is based on the results derived by Helmberger and 
Taylor, but it includes costs of co-operative membership as a new component in the analysis. 
 
The model 
We now turn to the model that will be used to explain the situation in the local coffee markets 
in Chiapas. In a given local market, a large number of small-scale farmers cultivate an 
agricultural product, coffee. We assume that the coffee is a homogeneous product for all the 
farmers, and denote the level of coffee supplied by q. The farmers sell their coffee to 
purchasers located in the area. Being numerous, the farmers are price takers in this local 
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market, and receive the price w for each bag of coffee. The price is determined by the 
farmers’ supply and the purchasers’ demand for coffee. The purchasers’ demand is 
determined by the final market price P, which is the price at which they sell the coffee on the 
international market. The international coffee market is highly competitive, and the 
purchasers are therefore price takers in the sales market. Hence the final market price P is 
taken as a constant.  
Marginal production costs are increasing in the quantity supplied, and given by w(q).  
While the number of coffee trees places a ceiling on how much coffee that can be harvested in 
a given period of time, some coffee trees are more accessible than others, and maintaining and 
harvesting more trees often implies going from the use of free household labour to hired 
labour. This gives rise to increasing marginal costs. Indeed, if the price of coffee is low, many 
farmers, and especially those who have to hire workers to harvest, prefer not to pick their 
coffee and instead look for work elsewhere. When the prices get higher, they can put more 
effort into the harvesting, taking several rounds and picking everything down to the last berry. 
This assumption is in line with the situation in Chiapas (Solís 2000, Martinez-Torres 2006).  
The purchasers in the area are either private purchasers or member-owned co-
operatives. They purchase coffee beans, process them and sell them on the international 
market. The companies are assumed to produce under constant returns, thus the industry is 
characterised by a flat marginal product (MRP) curve.  
 
Imperfect competition with private purchasers 
In this local market, a private purchaser operating as a sole buyer, or a few private purchasers 
operating as a cartel, will behave as a monopsonist. The private monopsonist will choose to 
buy coffee at a level where the marginal revenue product (MRP) equals the marginal expense 
(ME) for q. The monopsonist takes into account the fact that the increased demand for coffee 
will increase the purchase price not only for the last unit, but also for the whole quantity q 
purchased. The equilibrium result is illustrated in figure 1. A monopsonist private purchaser 
will earn P on the last unit bought, while paying the purchasing price WM.. The farmers in the 
area are worse off in a situation of monopsony than they would be in a situation with 
competition. The producer surplus they lose is equivalent to the area WM –M-C–P (the shaded 
and the grey area).  
If there are two or very few private purchasers who engage in capacity constrained 
competition (Cournot competition), the firms will take into account the effect that their 
purchases and the related price increase have on their own profit, but not the effect that it has 
on the profit of the other firms. Hence the total amount of coffee, q, demanded will be larger 
than in the case of monopsony, but the competitive solution will not be reached. The output 
level will be somewhere between the competitive and the monopsony solution, and likewise 
the price level.  
Hence, imperfect competition gives the farmers a lower producer surplus, because 
they sell less and get a lower price. The price and quantity is lowest under monopsony, but 
there will be a distortion also if the two purchasers are competing with each other as a 
Cournot duopsony. 
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Figure 1: Monopsonist private purchaser vs. monopsonist co-operative 
 
Mixed duopsony 
We will now look at a situation where a co-operative is formed in a market with a 
monopsonist private purchaser. We assume that the co-operative has an open membership 
policy. This means that while the private purchaser offers a price according to the marginal 
cost of production for the marginal farmer, the co-operative pays the farmer the international 
price P.  
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unprocessed coffee on its MRP curve. This follows the view of Taylor (1971), who based his 
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if it increases the input level from point QM to point Qc. This means that the members’ total 
incomes will be higher if the production level increases. Hence, if a co-operative is run as a 
democratic institution by its members, we can conclude that it will not choose output level QM 
and price wM.  
The co-operative offers a higher price than the private purchaser. But in order to sell to 
the co-operative, the farmers must become members, which incurs a cost f. Examples of costs 
that are typical for co-operatives are fees, delayed payment, specific requirements for 
production and compulsory co-operative meetings. We assume that this cost is zero or very 
low for a given share of the farmers, s. This group will therefore sell to the co-operative. 
There are several reasons why f is lower for one group than for another. One could be that 
farmers have different alternative costs of membership, which are mostly not financial, but 
related to time and labour. Assuming that the farmers have different opportunity costs to 
labour and different preferences concerning co-operative activities, they will have different 
valuations of the cost f. The difference in costs can be related to characteristics of the farmers 
such as the availability of family workforce and work opportunities elsewhere. We can also 
assume that co-operative membership implies certain services such as education, or more 
ideologically based benefits such as a ‘group feeling’. These are valued differently by the 
different farmers, and will for some compensate for the membership costs, for others not. 
Other reasons for the difference in the value of f could be that the farmers are located in 
different areas, which creates a difference in transport costs. 
 Before the co-operative is formed in the area, the private purchaser buys the amount 
QM, and pay the price wM, as shown in figure 1. The rest of the farmers, QC-QM, will either not 
harvest their coffee or transport it to a city nearby. This would be the farmers with the highest 
harvesting costs or the lowest transport costs. The co-operative is formed by a share s of the 
farmers, who deliver coffee to it. For illustrative purposes we assume that the curve ME1 now 
represents the supply curve for those of the farmers who do not belong to the group s, that is, 
those who do not initially sell to the co-operative, called type 2 farmers. We call this supply 
curve w2(q), and the MEs2-curve represents the marginal expense curve for these farmers (see 
figure 1). Deliveries to the co-operative are represented by the distance QC- QM.   
What happens next depends on the membership cost f. If f is high, the farmers not 
belonging to the group s will not find it worthwhile to join the co-operative. The private 
purchaser will maximise profits by purchasing where marginal expenses equals marginal 
revenue, hence where MEs2=P. It will, as before, offer the monopsonist price wi, but the 
market share will be lower than before, q2 instead of QM. Farmers QM- q2 will either not 
harvest or transport their coffee to the nearby city.  
The farmers will only find it worthwhile to become co-operative members if the co-
operative price P, less the membership costs f, are higher than what the private purchaser 
offers. If the private purchaser offers the monopsonist price wi, and if wi<P-f, it will be more 
beneficial for the remaining farmers to become co-operative members, and the private 
purchaser will lose the entire market. The optimal price for the private purchaser is w=P-f. At 
this price, the type 2 farmers are indifferent between joining the co-operative and selling to 
the private purchaser. At a price marginally above w, the type 2 farmers will sell to the private 
purchaser, who will buy amount q3. The farmers between q3 and QM will not harvest or sell 
their coffee elsewhere. 
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This simple model illustrates the pro-competitive effect of a co-operative which 
neither takes over the entire market, nor excludes a share of the farmers definitely. In this case 
the effect depends on the co-operative membership costs (and benefits), and the farmers’ 
preferences for these. The price w offered by the private purchaser is higher the lower are co-
operative costs f, and if f is sufficiently large, the co-operative will not have any pro-
competitive effect on the market price.  
In this model we have not assumed that there is a price premium involved for the co-
operative, as would be the case for the organic and Fairtrade certified co-operatives in 
Chiapas. If the price offered by the co-operative increases above the market price it would 
have the same effect as to decrease the costs of becoming a member of the organic co-
operative, f, and hence the pro-competitive effect would be stronger. We have also assumed 
that the co-operative and the private purchaser have the same level of efficiency, which is not 
realistic in the case of Chiapas, where private purchasers are large multinationals and the co-
operatives are small with many disadvantages in comparison, such as lack of administrative 
capacities and working capital. In the model, if the co-operative for some efficiency reasons 
offers a lower price than P, it would have the same effect as to increase f, and thereby reduce 
the competitive effect. Hence the extent of an organic and Fairtrade certified co-operatives’ 
pro-competitive effect is determined by the price premium, as well as the co-operative’s 
efficiency level, membership costs and the farmers’ preferences,  
4. Data analysis 
The theoretical analysis and the qualitative study suggest that the co-operatives in Chiapas 
promote competition. If the co-operatives force private purchasers to raise their price level, 
we should observe a difference in the prices offered to non-members in municipalities where 
there is a presence of co-operatives, compared to the municipalities where there are none. The 
next step is to do an analysis using official data on local coffee prices in Chiapas and a range 
of control variables to find out if co-operative presence leads to higher coffee prices for non 
members. 
 
Data sources and variables used 
For the empirical analysis of the research question, I have used coffee price data at 
municipality level from the Mexican governmental organisation Sistema Producto Café 
(SPC), from October 2001 to March 2007 (SPC 2007). The data stems from the earlier 
mentioned project called ‘Fondo de Estabilisación’ or ‘the stabilisation fund’, initiated in 
2001, which purpose is to stabilise coffee prices by collecting money from coffee farmers in 
years when coffee prices are high, and repay them a premium in years when the prices are 
low. Coffee buyers send the receipts from their purchases to SPC, and this price data is 
available on the SPC website as monthly averages for each municipality15. All the 75 coffee 
producing municipalities are included in the data set that I use16. According to SPC, the data 
                                                 
15 http://www.spcafe.org.mx 
16 I have also included the municipality San Cristobal de las Casas, an urban centre where no coffee production 
takes place, but where a lot of coffee sales are registered. 
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do not contain information from any Fairtrade co-operatives 17. This implies that the average 
monthly price data from each of the 75 coffee producing municipalities are largely based on 
the private purchases, not those made by the certified co-operatives. Hence it is to some extent 
possible to isolate the ‘yardstick effect’ from the direct effect of the Fairtrade/organic co-
operatives on average municipality coffee prices.  
Data on international coffee prices in the same period are from the International 
Coffee Organisation (ICO 2007). I have used the monthly averages of the ICO Indicator 
prices from the ‘Other Mild Arabicas Group’, which is the most common coffee type exported 
from Mexico. This is the price paid on the New York and Bremen/Hamburg markets. 
Five more explanatory variables are used: farm size, altitude, indigenousness, TNC 
subsidiary presence and a regional dummy. These variables are expected to be somehow 
related to the local coffee price and therefore need to be controlled for. Data on number of 
coffee producers and size of coffee producing area per municipality are from the official 
Mexican coffee organisation COMCAFE (Comisión para el desarrollo y fomento del café de 
Chiapas) (2007)18. These data were employed to generate a variable for average farm size. 
The Mexican Bureau of Statistics INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia) 
(2007) has provided data on altitude and indigenousness. The INEGI data give the altitude of 
the municipality centre, which is a rough measure since coffee producing villages may be 
situated at other altitudes. INEGI has data on the percentage of the population speaking 
indigenous languages. They give the numbers from the overall population in the municipality, 
and not just the coffee producers, but I assume that these are roughly similar. There are no 
official data on TNC presence, and information about the presence of TNC subsidiaries are 
from interviews made with the four most important TNC companies: AMSA, Cafes 
California, Expogranos Mexicanos and Becafisa. These companies are estimated to purchase 
85 percent of the coffee in Chiapas (Bellino 2002). 
 
Co-operative presence 
As mentioned before, there are many co-operatives in Chiapas that are neither Fairtrade nor 
organically certified, but it is difficult to collect valid information about these. Part of the 
reason is that many are registered mainly to apply for certain types of government support, 
and dismantled afterwards. Those who do collect coffee from members sell it locally to the 
transnational companies and the profits they generate are therefore lower than that of the 
certified co-operatives. I have to exclude these co-operatives from the analysis, but although 
they might have a pro-competitive effect on the market prices, it is probably in any case 
weaker than that of the certified co-operatives, since the price they offer is lower.  
Information about the number of Fairtrade co-operatives in each municipality comes 
from the Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO) and information about organic co-operatives 
are from the web page of the official Mexican agricultural organisation Agrochiapas 
(SNIDRUS 2007). I have used the co-operatives’ physical addresses to identify the 
                                                 
17There is possibly price information from some organic co-operatives, but SPC was unable to give more specific 
information about these organic co-operatives 
18 The data were delivered by the regional representative of COMCAFE in Tapachula 
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municipalities where they are present. For some of the organic co-operatives, only 
information about the postal addresses is available, while they could have members in other 
municipalities. The largest co-operatives (FIECH, ISMAM, Tiemenlonla and La Selva) have 
members and collect coffee in several municipalities, and I have used membership lists and 
the co-operatives’ web pages to identify the municipalities where they are present. For most 
of the co-operatives there is no information about number of members. Of the 75 
municipalities in the data set, 36 have no co-operative presence. In 24 municipalities there are 
1 or 2 co-operatives, 9 have 3 or 5, and 6 municipalities have more than 6 cooperatives, 
among which one has 13 and one 22. 
A problem with the organic co-operatives is that Agrochiapas does not have 
information about when the 174 organic coffee co-operatives were formed. We only know 
that they are present in 2006. This means that although the price data are monthly 
observations from 2001-2007 there is little to gain from using panel data methods, although 
endogeneity and potential omitted variable problems would thus have been avoided. 
The alternative is to run an OLS regression on the average prices for the different 
municipalities, and look at their relationship with co-operative presence. However, since I 
only have information about organic co-operatives that existed in 2006, a price average based 
on a whole period implies a possible mismatch. Some of these co-operatives were probably 
formed after 2001, but I measure their effect as if they were present during the whole period. 
This could weaken the results. It is therefore better to use average prices for a period with 
more reliable data on organic co-operative presence, which means 2006. 
A problem with OLS is that if the municipalities with certified co-operatives have 
some characteristics in common that we cannot control for, it could be these characteristics 
that lead to the better price, and not the co-operative presence. For instance it is possible that 
producers with sufficient organisational skills to form co-operatives, are also better 
negotiators and therefore able to obtain better prices from private purchasers. Or the case 
could be that co-operatives are more likely to be established in regions where the coffee 
quality is higher, due to climatic conditions or other geographical conditions than altitude 
(which is controlled for). This means that there could be an endogeneity problem. 
Without the possibility to use panel data methods, the question that needs to be looked 
into is: why are there Fairtrade and organically certified co-operatives in some areas, and not 
in others? Obviously, each co-operative has its own story which is unique. However, few 
smallholder organisations are able to handle the complexities of certification and entering the 
coffee export market on their own (Gonzalez and Nigh 2005). Hence many of them have in 
common that they at the initial phase have received help and support from someone outside 
the community, someone with education and knowledge. In some cases this has been a person 
from a religious organisation, while other co-operatives have been initiated under the 
influence of external actors with an academic or political background. In the previously 
mentioned small survey, only nine of the 38 organic co-operatives said they had not received 
any external support when they were formed (see table 2 in section 2). Eight of the co-
operatives had received help from a religious person, seven from a person related to an NGO, 
the rest from political or academic people.  
There are several answers to the question why these external people chose to go to one 
village instead of another to help with the formation and certification of a co-operative. For 
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instance, Tiemenlonla in Palenque was started by two Catholic nuns who saw it as their 
vocation to go and help the marginalised people in Chiapas. They were told that the Chole 
people in the Selva region were among the poorest, so they went there to work and ended up 
creating a coffee co-operative with the villagers. In another case, a Catholic priest who was 
sent to work in Motozintla gathered a group of coffee producers and later became the advisor 
of ISMAM, a co-operative which now has more than 1200 members. The co-operative Maya 
Vinic, whose members belong to the religious group ‘Los Abejas’ received a lot of attention 
and external support after the massacre in Acteal in 1997, when 45 men, women and children 
from this group were killed by paramilitaries. Thanks to this support, particularly from foreign 
organisations, they were able to create their own coffee organisation.  
In other words, elements not related to the population’s strength in negotiating with 
coffee intermediaries, or the region’s coffee quality, seem to be important factors when 
explaining the formation and success of co-operatives in Chiapas. Rather, one should expect 
that a benevolent external actor would choose to go to particularly marginalised regions, 
where the population would be uninformed about the functioning of the coffee market and not 
particularly good at negotiating with coffee intermediaries. This could have the effect of 
making the correlation between coffee prices and co-operative presence negative, not positive, 
unless the co-operative has a pro-competitive effect.  
 
Explanatory variables 
This section presents the different explanatory or control variables and the reasons why their 
inclusion is relevant. 
Farmsize: Some of the interviewed stakeholders in Chiapas reported that the private 
purchasers pay more when they buy larger quantities because travel expenses and other 
transfer costs are lower per kilo. In areas where farmers produce larger quantities, hence 
where the average farm size is larger, it is expected that the prices are higher. Another reason 
to expect a positive correlation between average farm size and price is that larger producers 
have more resources and therefore do not need to borrow money from the private purchasers, 
and thus be forced to accept a lower price. Being relatively better off, they might also have 
more education and be better informed, and generally be better at price negotiating with the 
purchasers.  
Altitude: Coffee grown at higher altitudes has a higher quality than that grown closer 
to sea level. Lower altitude coffee is more damaged, and the beans are smaller. Therefore a 
positive correlation between altitude and price is expected.  
Indigenousness: A negative relation between percentage of indigenous people and 
coffee prices is expected, since the qualitative study indicates that indigenous people are to a 
larger extent taken advantage of by the intermediaries. This could possibly be because of 
language problems, but it was also indicated that this is a continuation of an old practice, 
going back to the colonial era. At this time indigenous people were forced to accept the rules 
that were imposed upon them, which meant the establishing of a pattern which is difficult to 
break.  
TNC presence: In some municipalities the large coffee purchasing TNCs have opened 
their own subsidiaries. It is not clear what the price effect of their presence is expected to be. 
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On the one hand they are buying further down the chain, and therefore possibly paying a 
higher price. If they compete with the local intermediaries they could increase the local 
purchasing price. On the other hand, they could also operate as large monopsonists with the 
opposite effect.  
Regional dummy: It is also relevant to control for regional price variation. The 
municipalities in Chiapas were divided into two groups with the dummy variables ‘North’ and 
‘South’. There are several factors that can explain regional variation; one could be that the 
southern regions are the ones where coffee was first introduced in the 19th century and there is 
more knowledge about coffee production and sales infrastructure here (Renard 2006). It could 
also be that this variable captures weaknesses of road quality, which is poorer in the highlands 
and the jungle of the north than nearby the coast in the south, and thereby the price the 
intermediary pays is also lower in the north than in the south.  
One variable that should have been controlled for is distance to the nearest coffee 
exporting centre, which would reflect transport costs. Unfortunately I was unable to locate 
any official calculations of this. When using the air distance calculated with a map, there are 
no significant results. Possibly the distance from the municipality centres to the exporting 
centre matters less for the price than the distance from the local villages to the municipality 
head. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Since I only have information about co-operative presence in 2006, it is relevant to use price 
data from this period. The data used are only from the harvest season, December to May. The 
reason for this is that, firstly, I assume the off season data are noisier because it stems from 
less coffee deliveries from fewer municipalities. It is also more relevant to investigate the co-
operatives’ pro-competitive effect by looking at the data at the time when the co-operatives 
are buying coffee from the members. This means that the data used are from the last entire 
coffee harvest, from December 2005 to May 2006.  
The price data is used in the following manner: First I take the log of the ICO Arabica 
prices and the SPC prices, then deduct the log ICO price from the log SPC price to get the 
difference between the two price levels19. My dependent variable is the average price 
difference, or the local price relative to the international price, per municipality, over the 
period in question.  
There is variation in the difference between the log of local price and the log of world 
market price in the different municipalities. This can be seen in the histograms below.  
 
                                                 
19 In some municipalities data is missing for certain months. Due to the strong variation in prices it makes sense 
to look at the local prices relative to the international prices instead of in absolute terms. 
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Figure 2: Histogram price difference international and local level 
0
2
4
6
8
D
en
si
ty
-.3 -.25 -.2 -.15 -.1
Difference log of international and local price
0
5
10
15
D
en
si
ty
-.3 -.25 -.2 -.15 -.1
Difference log of international and local price (weighted)
 
Note: Density of different levels of difference between ICO indicator price for Other Mild Arabica Group 
(Mexican pesos per 45. 36 kilo (100 lb) green coffee), and average coffee prices paid to non co-operative 
members in Chiapas. The first histogram is based on number of municipalities, the second is weighted with 
number of producers in the municipalities.. 
Source: ICO (2007) and SPC (2007) 
 
The histograms show that most of the municipalities have average price differences 
concentrated on the middle section. The graph weighted with number of producers shows a 
higher density at the level just below the middle than the graph based on the municipalities. 
This means that in reality, more producers receive the lower than the municipality based 
average price.  
A simple comparison of the price difference in municipalities with co-operative 
presence above and below the median for the sample shows that in the municipalities with 
more co-operatives the average difference between local and world market price is 204 pesos, 
while in those with less co-operatives than the median it is 226, implying a ten percent price 
increase. This indicates that producers receive 22 Mexican pesos more per quintal in the 
municipalities with co-operatives. The average yearly production of coffee producers in 
Chiapas is 8.31 quintals (COMCAFE 2007), which means that these producers receive 
approximately 200 pesos, 15 USD more for their harvest.  
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Table 3: Summary statistics for the harvest period 2005-2006, municipality level 
 
Variable description 
Obs Mean Std 
Dev 
Min Max 
Average difference between log of local  price and log of 
international price December 2005-May 2006 
75 -0.2 0.05 -0.32 -0.08
Number of organic co-ops  75 1.8 3.4 0 22
Number of organic co-ops per 100 coffee producer 75 0.12 0.34 0 0.22
Percentage of population not speaking Spanish 75 8.7 14.5 0 50.8
Altitude, in metres 75 931 642 20 2740
Number of coffee producers  75 2240 2578 0 13860
Average farm size, in hectares 75 1.39 0.98 0.11 5.38
Number of TNCs  75 0.4 0.9 0 4
Number of TNCs per 100 coffee producer 75 0.13 0.94 0 0.82
The municipality is in the north of Chiapas (dummy) 75 0.62 0.49 0 1
 
Regression analysis 
The following model describes the expected relationship: 
 
εδββ ++= 21cooppdiff  
 
Where diffp is the average over the period of the difference between the log of the 
municipality price and the log of the international price. The variable coop  is the number of 
organic co-operatives divided by number of coffee producers in the municipality, and δ  is a 
vector of different control variables including average coffee farm size, fraction of population 
not speaking Spanish, altitude, number of TNC subsidiaries divided by number of coffee 
producers in the municipality, plus a dummy for whether the municipality is in the northern 
part of Chiapas.  
Two municipalities, Chiapa de Corzo and Tuxtla Gutierrez are outliers. These two 
municipalities are in lowland, urbanised areas and there are few coffee producers there (46 in 
Chiapa de Corzo and 49 in Tuxtla), but each has one coffee co-operative, therefore the value 
for co-operatives per producer is high. The coffee price is also rather high in these 
municipalities, 11% above average in Chiapa de Corzo and 6% above average in Tuxtla. One 
could therefore suspect them to be driving positive result for the co-operative presence’s 
impact on coffee prices.  The regressions are therefore done with and without these two 
municipalities. The results are depicted in table 4, columns 1-4. 
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Table 4: Regression results 
 Dependent variable: Log (local price)-log(world market price)  
December 05-May 06    December -May 2001-2005 
 Other 
variables 
excluded 
Main 
specification 
Other variables, 
Chiapa de Corzo 
and Tuxtla 
excluded 
Chiapa de 
Corzo and 
Tuxtla 
excluded 
 Other 
variables 
excluded 
Main 
specification 
Other variables, 
Chiapa de Corzo 
and Tuxtla 
excluded 
Chiapa de 
Corzo and 
Tuxtla 
excluded 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of co-operatives per 
100 producer 
0.053*** 
(0.01) 
0.046*** 
(0.01) 
0.099** 
(0.039) 
0.075** 
(0.03) 
 0.054*** 
(0.009) 
0.062*** 
(0.015) 
0.057 
(0.039) 
0.03 
(0.029) 
          
Fraction of population not 
speaking Spanish 
 -0.08** 
(0.03) 
 -0.08** 
(0.03) 
  -0.09*** 
(0.02) 
 -0.09*** 
(0.02) 
          
Average coffee farm size  0.002 
(0.006) 
 0.001 
(0.006) 
  0.01 
(0.008) 
 0.011 
(0.008) 
          
Altitude, in 100 meters  0.0005 
(0.0008) 
 0.0005  
(0.0007) 
  0.002** 
(0.0007) 
 0.002*** 
(0.0007) 
          
Number of TNCs per 100 
producer 
 0.3 
(0.3) 
 -0.02 
(0.06) 
  -0.07 
(0.4) 
 -0.01 
(0.05) 
          
The municipality is in the north  -0.035*** 
(0.01) 
 -0.035*** 
(0.01) 
  -0.02 
(0.01) 
 -0.02 
(0.01) 
          
Number of observation 75 75 73 73  75 75 73 73 
R-squared 0.16 0.44 0.18 0.38  0.16 0.42 0.16 0.36 
*** Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level
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The coefficient for co-operative presence is positive and significant for all the specifications 
used with prices from the harvest period 2005-2006. Hence the results indicate that co-
operative presence leads to increased local coffee prices. The economic interpretation of the 
results of the main specification is that if co-operative presence increases by 1 co-operative 
per 100 producers, the local price increase with 4.6%. The average local price in Chiapas for 
the harvest period 2005-2006 was 1022 Mexican pesos per quintal. A price increase of 4.6% 
is then 47 Mexican pesos. For the entire harvest, which for the average producer is 8.31 
quintals, the price increase then corresponds to 390 pesos added income, or 29 USD.  
When all the control variables are excluded, an increase in co-operative presence by 
one co-operative for every 100 farmers leads to a 5,3% increase in the local price .When 
Chiapa de Corzo and Tuxtla Guiterrez, the two outliers, are excluded the percentage is larger, 
7.5%, but the result is less significant. When the control variables and the outliers are 
excluded, the percentage increase in price is 9.9%.  
Looking at the main specification for the harvest period 2005-2006 (column 1-4), the 
geographical dummy for northern municipalities is negative and significant, indicating that in 
the municipalities in the north the local coffee price is 3.5% larger than in the municipalities 
in the southern region of Chiapas.  
The regression shows that producers with indigenous origins receive lower prices than 
the Spanish speaking people. The coefficient for percentage of population in the municipality 
not speaking Spanish is negative and significant. Economically, a 50% increase in Spanish 
speaking habitants corresponds to a 4% increase in the local price. Although it is not very 
strong, there is still an effect. One of the reasons for this could that the non Spanish speaking 
population is more marginalised, meaning more illiterate and isolated. But when running the 
same regressions with a variable for marginalisation,20 its coefficient is negative but not 
significant. When the indigenous variable is included in the same regression marginalisation 
changes sign and is less significant. That indigenousness has a stronger effect than 
marginalisation indicates that racial discrimination could be an important factor. 
As a robustness check I run the same regressions with harvest season data from 2001-
2005. The results can be seen in column 5-8 in table 4. The coefficients for cooperative 
presence for the different specifications are not very different from the ones in the 2005-2006 
regressions, but when the outliers are excluded, it is not significant any more. An explanation 
to this is that there is incorrect information about co-operative presence in this period. Many 
of the co-operatives that were present in 2006 were established in the years before. This will 
bias the results downwards.  
There are also other factors that give reason for not finding more statistical and 
economic support for the hypothesis. Firstly, this is a data set with relatively few 
observations, the 75 municipalities. Secondly, there are probably many co-operatives included 
in the data set that are too small and too inefficient to have a ‘competitive yardstick effect’ on 
their private competitors. This corresponds to the findings in the survey, where 45% of the 
                                                 
20 Data collected by El Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO). They contain information about the shares 
of the population who are illiterate, without primary school, without sewage, without electricity, without water, 
with dirt floor and without refrigerators. 
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respondents said they did not feel that their co-operative had made the intermediaries increase 
their price. Thirdly, there are probably some municipalities without Fairtrade and organic co-
operatives where the coyotes are competing with each other and driving prices to a 
competitive level. Possibly there may be co-operatives in these municipalities which are not 
certified and therefore not registered in the data set. Lastly, there is always the problem with 
accuracy of the data. In particular, for some of the organic co-operatives I have only used the 
postal addresses, and their real locations might be in different municipalities. And even when 
I have the physical address of the co-operative warehouse, it is possible that it also receives 
coffee from members in villages in neighbouring municipalities. It could also be that organic 
co-operatives exist that are not in the Agrochiapas or FLO registers. These aspects will all 
bias the results downwards. 
 
Conclusion 
The qualitative study from Chiapas indicates that the coffee purchasing market suffers from 
imperfect competition and that Faitrade and organic co-operatives in some cases counteract 
monopsony power among coffee purchasers. This can also be shown in a theoretical model 
which predicts that co-operatives will have the effect of raising the general coffee price level 
in areas where they operate. The statistical analysis also supports the hypothesis that co-
operative presence has a positive effect on prices paid to non members. I cannot say that I 
have found clear evidence, but this could possibly be due to statistical problems such as 
missing data, particularly on co-operatives. 
 In the statistical analysis the only measures used to evaluate the impact of the co-
operatives are the coffee prices. Recall that in the qualitative study, interviewed stakeholders 
in Chiapas emphasised the cheating behaviour of the private intermediary purchasers, meaning 
their tendency to cheat on the weight or make unfair quality discounts. There are no data 
available on these aspects, and hence there is no way to statistically prove the findings of the 
qualitative study, that co-operatives also have an effect on the cheating behaviour of the 
intermediaries. In the survey among organic co-operatives in Chiapas it was found that more 
co-operatives (74%) thought they had effect on the cheating behaviour than on the pricing 
behaviour of the intermediaries (50%). If it is the case that the reduced cheating effect is more 
important than the price effect, then presumably in reality the pro-competitive effect is 
stronger than the results from the OLS regression indicate. 
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Abstract 
The paper investigates the relationship between democracy and economic success in Fairtrade 
certified coffee co-operatives. The Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO) is a solidarity 
focussed initiative which emphasises democracy in the certified organisations. Democracy 
may be a tool for the empowerment of marginalised producers and can therefore be seen as an 
aim in itself. The question raised is: can democracy also have a positive effect on the 
economic success of the certified co-operatives?  A literature review and a field study based 
on interviews with co-operatives in Chiapas, Mexico indicate that democracy may improve 
the decision making processes and the control of leadership. The statistical analysis is based 
on a unique data set from the Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO), which consists of 
evaluations of Latin American Fairtrade co-operatives between 2001 and 2005. The results of 
the analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that democracy and economic success are 
positively correlated. 
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1. Introduction 
Many of the world’s poor belong to households of agricultural smallholders such as coffee 
producers. Their situation is made difficult by price fluctuations and an overall trend of price 
decrease, as well as lack of access to markets (Markelova et al 2009). An opportunity which 
has lately opened up for many small scale coffee producers is to join a Fairtrade certified 
marketing co-operative. This provides them with access to the international export market and 
the possibility to obtain the Fairtrade guaranteed minimum price and premium which 
improves their economic situation. Fairtrade labelled coffee is generally consumed in the 
North and it is marketed as a solidarity product that secures “a better deal for producers in the 
developing world” (FLO 2009). Consumers expect that by buying these products they will 
make a difference for the producers. In order to maintain confidence in the system the 
Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO) puts much effort into the elaboration of standards and 
supervision of the co-operatives to make sure that requirements for certification are fulfilled. 
FLO visits the co-operatives on a regular basis to evaluate their performance, in particular 
whether the organisation’s democratic goals are fulfilled. Co-operatives that do not fulfil the 
criteria receive letters with recommendations for improvements, and in cases of particularly 
severe violations they will not obtain recertification. 
The question of how democracy and economic efficiency are linked has previously 
been raised and investigated both in relation to the organisation of firms (Cable and FitzRoy 
1980, Jones and Svejnar 1985, Doucouliagos 1995, Yates 2006) and the ruling of nations 
(Lipset 1959, Barro 1999, Acemoglu et al. 2008). However, there are few studies of this 
relationship on agricultural co-operatives in developing countries, and none based on 
Fairtrade coffee co-operatives. 
The democratic aspect is particularly important in developing countries where 
corruption is widespread and a well functioning democratic system is often lacking. If co-
operative members are educated on democratic procedures and mentality they may become a 
resource for society at large (Bowles and Gintis 1993). The empowerment and capacity 
building is, according to Raynolds et al. (2004), the most valuable effect of the Fairtrade 
labelling system. Democracy and transparency are also important tools for members to 
supervise hired and elected managers (Hansmann 1996). However, democracy typically 
comes at the cost of reduced decision-making flexibility, which may reduce economic 
effectiveness (Bianchi 2002, Thorp et al 2005). 
The ambition of the present paper is to analyse empirically the question of democratic 
organisations and economic performance, using Fairtrade coffee cooperatives as a case in 
point. Does FLO’s emphasis on democratic structures come at a price, namely higher costs 
hence poorer economic performance, or do democracy and economic success go hand in 
hand? 
In order to shed light on these questions, I make use of a data set from FLO, the 
evaluations of the certified coffee co-operatives written by Fairtrade inspectors. This 
comprises a relatively large database with detailed information about each co-operative. To 
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my knowledge, the present study is the first one to make use of this data for statistical analysis 
of any kind.  
The paper starts with a general description of the administration of the Fairtrade 
certified coffee co-operatives. In the next section various possible links between democracy 
and economic success are assessed through literature reviews and field research of Fairtrade 
co-operatives in Chiapas, Mexico. Then follows a statistical analysis of the FLO evaluations 
from the Spanish speaking Latin American Fairtrade coffee co-operatives between 2001 and 
2005. 
2. Democracy in Fairtrade certified co-operatives 
For coffee co-operatives to become Fairtrade certified they must be able to export, consist of 
generally small scale producers and be democratic organisations that provide members with 
economic and social benefits. There are also environmental criteria on the use of chemical 
inputs, and social criteria on the use of hired labour. The co-operatives cover the costs for 
certification. Once they are certified, they may sell their product under Fairtrade conditions, 
which include a minimum price of 121 US cent/lb and a premium of 10 cents/lb. This requires 
that they are able to find an importer wanting to buy coffee under these conditions. The 
importer will in turn market the coffee with the Fairtrade label, for consumers to recognise. 
The fact that all the co-operatives in the sample are certified to the same standard 
means that they all have, to some extent, achieved a certain level of economic success. They 
have found a niche, a market opportunity that potentially can provide them with better terms 
of trade than what is obtained on the conventional market. But the analysis of the evaluations 
made by FLO inspectors shows that the Latin American Fairtrade co-operatives have different 
levels of economic success. Some prosper; they offer members a good price and invest in 
income generating activities, while others have financial problems and struggle to keep their 
member base. There are also differences concerning their democratic levels: some have high 
participation levels and well functioning democratic structures, while others are dysfunctional 
to the point that they are in danger of being excluded from the Fairtrade system. 
Fairtrade coffee co-operatives in Chiapas, Mexico2 
The members of the Fairtrade coffee co-operatives produce their coffee on individual farms. 
They then market it jointly through the co-operative and share the profits thus generated 
according to quantities delivered. These co-operatives therefore do not have collective action 
problems such as free riding when it comes to the production of coffee. But the members still 
have to administer the different activities of the co-operatives as a collective task. These 
                                                 
2The following description is based on field research which was done in Chiapas during a ten month period in 
2006/2007. Altogether 50 in depth interviews were made with co-operative managers and other stakeholders in 
the coffee producing sector. Information related to the democratic aspect came up in many of these interviews, 
and in addition five in depth interviews were made with co-operative staff members and advisors on democracy 
only. 
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activities are mainly concerned with the marketing process: finding importers, organising 
deliveries, processing, transport, finance, payment and so on. In some cases the co-operatives 
also roast and grind some of their coffee before selling it. Furthermore the certification 
process must be organised in order to receive both the Fairtrade and in many cases also other 
certificates such as the organic. In addition many co-operatives lobby governments and NGOs 
for support for different projects. They also organise courses for member on coffee production 
and other issues such as health. Some co-operatives diversify into other sectors such as honey, 
crafts or tourism.  
The different Fairtrade certified co-operatives in Chiapas share similar democratic 
structures, which again are similar to the ones described in the FLO evaluation reports from 
other Latin American countries. The members, who usually live dispersed in different 
villages, have meetings on a regular basis, usually once a month. In some cases meetings are 
compulsory and members are penalised for not showing up. Member groups in each 
community elect a delegate who goes regularly to meetings at the co-operative headquarters, 
where he or she will represent the community and report their opinions and ideas. The 
information that the delegate receives here is in turn dispersed to the members at the 
community meetings. In some cases the co-operative produces written information that the 
delegates can distribute in their communities, but often this is meaningless since the members 
are illiterate. Sometimes this is the case also for the delegate, who has to try to memorize the 
information he or she has received. In these cases distribution of information will often be 
deficient.  
Usually the co-operatives have a general assembly once a year, where all the members 
are invited to participate. Every second or every third year the general assembly elects a new 
committee with president, secretary and treasurer. Often they also elect a control committee 
and sometimes a conflict resolution committee. In addition to the elected committees, the co-
operatives often hire staff members with different responsibilities such as for coffee exporting 
or overseeing the members’ coffee production methods. The total number of elected and hired 
staff members generally increase with the number of members in the co-operatives. Larger 
co-operatives may hire staff members as secretaries or with responsibility for additional 
activities such as roasting and packaging, craft sections etc. In smaller co-operatives there are 
often no hired staff members and the administration is entirely the responsibility of the elected 
committees. Many co-operatives also have an advisor, in Chiapas this is often an external 
person with either a religious or political background, who has been with the co-operative 
from its beginning. Usually the advisor and the hired staff members have previous experience 
from the coffee business sector, while the elected committee members are only experienced as 
producers. This inequality of knowledge can create a latent power struggle between the 
political leadership and the hired staff (Martinez-Torres 2006 p. 94). The elected president is 
the official head of the co-operative, but sometimes the leader is in reality the advisor or 
another hired staff member.  
Members in these co-operatives influence to a varying degree the decisions that their 
elected and hired leaders make. Important decisions taken in the co-operatives are typically 
concerned with the determination of the price level and the implementation of new projects. 
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Decisions such as these can be taken by the hired staff members only, or in consultation with 
either the elected committee, the assembly of delegates or the general assembly.  
Democracy and economic success 
In previous literature on co-operatives and other democratic business organisations there are 
several explanations to finding both a positive and negative association between democracy 
and economic success. These aspects were also recognised among the co-operatives in 
Chiapas. 
The relationship between members and managers of a co-operative can be seen as a 
principal agent relationship, where the members need to monitor the managers (Bowles and 
Gintis 1993). Managers that are not properly monitored may shirk, spend money 
unnecessarily on for instance travels and meals for themselves, or even become downright 
corrupt. Hence there are agency costs related with insufficient monitoring (Hansmann 1996). 
One could claim that democratic structures, particularly structures that increase transparency, 
are necessary for a proper monitoring of the managers. From this it could be expected that less 
democratic co-operatives also have a worse economic performance.  
Lack of efficient control by members is a problem in many co-operatives in Chiapas; 
this is clear from the many stories of corruption among co-operative leaders. One story of 
corruption in a co-operative, which was not Fairtrade certified, was told in the following 
manner: 
“There was fraud, because there were advisors, accountants, who were all from other 
places, and for the poor producers, who have no education, they don’t know, well, 
they just deliver their coffee. “I’ll pay you this price”, that’s how it was, but in reality 
that wasn’t the price, most of it was left with the advisors, the accountants.3” 
Co-operative staff member and son of producer, Los Altos 
 
This was a story of how the members of a co-operative were deceived by the externally hired 
advisor and accountant, who took their money. The members were just ‘delivering their 
coffee’, they had no insight into the administrative matters of the co-operative, and were 
therefore not in real control. The probability of corruption in co-operatives is a heavy 
argument for the promotion of democracy and transparency. 
Another reason to expect a positive correlation between democracy and economic 
success is that the members of a co-operative may have important knowledge which is 
relevant for making the best decisions (Hansmann 1996). If decisions are based mainly on 
externally hired staff members’ ideas and opinions, they could be misplaced and therefore 
lead to economic failure. This corresponds to the findings of Berdegué (2000), based on a 
                                                 
3 “ había fraude, porque habían asesores, contadores, que todos ellos son de fuera, pues, y a los pobres 
productores, como no tienen estudios, no saben pues, solo entregan su café, “que te pago a este precio”, así 
salió, pero en realidad no es el precio pues, ya la mayor parte se les queda a los asesores, los contadores.” 
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study of agricultural co-operatives in Chile, that the skills of the leaders are less important for 
economic and social successfulness than the participation of members.  
However, although it is likely that individuals who know what is best for them are 
better off with regimes that are responsive to their wishes, expressed through active 
participation and voting, individuals may not always have all the necessary information to 
know what is best for them (Manin et al 1999).  If individuals are uninformed and possess 
false beliefs and unattainable goals active participation would not necessarily lead to better 
decisions. Likewise in the co-operative literature it has been argued that members may not be 
the most able to choose the most advantageous path for the organisation, because they do not 
see the big picture, they lack education, training and experience (Harrison and Freeman 2004, 
Bernard and Spielman 2009). 
In general the interviewed co-operative staff members in Chiapas supported the view 
that it is important to take the members’ knowledge and opinions into account, although some 
of the co-operative leaders considered it a problem that the members often lacked an 
understanding of the co-operative processes. One co-operative staff member emphasised the 
quality of the suggestions made by members, claiming that this was essential since the 
members were the ones who better saw what their needs were.   
We have always said: everyone has the right to participate and make decisions. And 
from that the best solutions will come out. That helps a lot to create strength, right? 
Inside the co-operative4.  
        Co-operative staff member, Los Altos 
 
Democracy may also increase economic success because decisions taken democratically are 
more legitimate than decisions taken by leaders who do not consult members. Decisions taken 
jointly increase the trust in their fairness, and they are therefore easier accepted and 
implemented (Cable and Fitzroy 1980). In many cases the motivation of members is 
important, for instance when it comes to the implementation of technical change and 
innovations (Vanek 1970). This claim corresponds to the field research in Chiapas. 
Decisions taken by members were always listened to, one staff member said.  Another co-
operative staff member explained the following about the importance of collective decisions: 
                                                 
4 Nosotros siempre hemos dicho, todos tenemos derecho a participar a tomar decisiones. Y de ahí se va a sacar 
las mejores decisiones. Eso ayudaría mucho a construir más fuerza, no? Dentro de la cooperativa. 
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They are better when the members take them and because the members take them. 
Sometimes, when a decision is taken, or a proposal is made which is not agreed upon, 
then this proposal will fall. Sooner or later the proposal falls, it seizes to have validity. 
Because for the organisations, one of the most important points are the decisions 
agreed between everyone. 5 
Co-operative advisor, Los Altos 
 
In other words, taking decisions without the members’ approval could be counterproductive, 
since these decisions are not perceived as valid in the same way as a democratic decision, and 
therefore they are more difficult to implement. This, however, would only be the case for 
implementations that require the members’ active collaboration, which might not be necessary 
for all kinds of decisions. 
But democratic processes can also be time consuming. In many cases decisions need to be 
taken quickly, and if the leaders must consult members first, it may be too late and the 
opportunity will be lost. Hence democracy may slow down efficient decision-making (Jones 
and Svejnar 1985, Bianchi 2002).  
Some of the interviewed co-operative staff members in Chiapas confirmed that 
democracy is both costly and reduces the flexibility of decision making. As explained by a co-
operative advisor: 
Too much democracy can turn into bureaucracy. This is a danger, a threat that there 
can be in co-operatives. (...) When all the decisions need to pass through superior 
levels it takes away the activity and the flexibility of the work.6 
Co-operative advisor, Los Altos 
 
For example, it was said that co-operatives managers who were too concerned about 
consulting the members could lose opportunities to get favourable loans because time limits 
ran out.  
What we can see from this is that there are costs of democracy in terms of loss of 
flexibility, but these are weighted against the benefits: control of leadership, the members’ 
contributions to the decisions, the increased legitimacy and facilitated implementation of the 
decisions. Among the stakeholders in Chiapas, the benefits from democracy were generally 
                                                 
5 Son mejores cuando los hacen los socios y porque las hacen los socios. En ocasiones, cuando se toma una 
decisión, o se hace una propuesta no concertada, cae esta propuesta. Tarde o temprano se cae la propuesta, 
deja de tener validez. Porque para la organización cooperativa, una de los puntos más importantes son las 
decisiones acordadas entre todos.  
6 Un exceso de democracia puede convertirse en burocracia. Eso es un peligro un amenaza que puede haber en 
las cooperativas. (…) Cuando todas las decisiones se tiene que pasar por niveles superiores se le quita actividad 
y flexibilidad al trabajo.  
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seen as more important than the costs. In particular the control function of democracy seems 
to be valuable. The many stories of corruption and mismanagement in co-operatives, and the 
high level of corruption in Mexico and other Latin American countries indicate that 
transparency and control by members is a necessary preventive strategy. Summing up, given 
the environment of often poorly functioning institutions in the societies that we are studying, 
FLOs emphasis on democracy is likely to have a positive impact on the economic success of 
the co-operatives. 
3. Statistical analysis of the FLO evaluation reports 
The following section is a statistical analysis with data from FLO certified coffee co-
operatives in Latin America. This data will be used to see if there is a correlation between the 
level of democracy and economic success in these co-operatives. 
3.1. Data background 
Data 
The data base contains 285 evaluations of Fairtrade co-operatives in Mexico, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, The Dominican Republic, Columbia, 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, from 157 different co-operatives. The co-operatives 
have been evaluated on an irregular basis, between one and four times, from 2001 to 2005 
(one from 2006). These evaluations, which are from all the coffee producing, Spanish 
speaking Latin American countries, comprise my data base7. The FLO evaluations have so far 
not been studied by independent researchers for academic purposes. 
Evaluations  
The inspectors who have written the evaluations are either locally based or people travelling 
from Europe. The inspectors go through a course with FLO and training with an experienced 
inspector. 31 different inspectors have evaluated the co-operatives in the dataset. Each 
inspector has written between 1 and 39 evaluations.  
During the inspection visit at the co-operative, which usually lasts from 2 to 5 days, 
the inspectors interview staff members, investigate administrative documents and select 
villages at random where they go to speak to members. 
The evaluations have the form of a questionnaire with approximately 200 questions, 
each to be answered either by a quantity or by 'yes', 'no' or 'partly'. The different sections are 
concerned with economy, democracy, development, environment and the use of the Fairtrade 
premium. There is also a section where the inspector gives his or her general impressions of 
                                                 
7 I received the evaluations in March 2006, in word files. The evaluations were then entered manually into 
spreadsheets. The ones from Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica (77 evaluations) 
were entered by a hired assistant. I myself have entered the other evaluations. The data base used for this 
analysis does not contain all the Fairtrade certified coffee co-operatives from this period. This is because some of 
the evaluations made by FLO have not been transferred into their data base, or it has a different form, 
incompatible with the rest. 
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the co-operative concerning different aspects, and the inspector also writes résumés about the 
co-operative and the area where it is situated. 
The inspector has sometimes left questions unanswered. This could be either because 
the co-operatives were unable to provide the necessary information, because the question for 
some reason was irrelevant for the co-operatives, or for other, unknown reasons. 
Some basic facts about the co-operatives 
The average foundation year for the co-operatives is 1989. The oldest co-operative is from 
1961, the most recent was founded in 2003. About 20% of the co-operatives were founded 
before 1980, 60% were founded after 1990.  
The average number of members in the co-operatives is 522; the smallest has 17 
members and the largest 7503. The median is 200 members. 30% of the co-operatives have 
less than 100 and only 15% have more than 1000 members. In other words the majority are 
small co-operatives.  
 Below is a table of descriptive statistics, based on the averages for the co-operatives 
that provide the information. The mean numbers for each country are based on the means for 
the co-operatives. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics FLO registered co-operatives 
 Evaluations 
Number 
of coops 
Mean 
foundation year
Mean FLO 
register year 
Mean number 
of members 
Mean plot 
size 
Bolivia 27 16 1986 1999 163 3.2 
Colombia 41 21 1993 1997 361 1.9 
Costa Rica 3 2 1995 1990 1868 2 
Dominican 
Republic 
4 2 1994 1998 2828 2.7 
Ecuador 5 3 2001 2003 490 2.2 
El Salvador 5 4 1995 2003 105 1.3 
Guatemala 29 20 1989 1999 349 1.1 
Honduras 25 17 1992 1996 91 2.4 
Mexico 76 35 1993 1999 550 2.5 
Nicaragua 17 10 1997 1999 532 3 
Peru 48 23 1985 2000 1117 3 
Venezuela 4 2 1990 1993 387 3.7 
Total 285 157 1990 1998 570 2.6 
Source: FLO data base 2001-2005 
There is significant variation in how many co-operatives there are in each country, from 35 
(Mexico) to 3 (Costa Rica). The difference could either be because some countries have less 
coffee producers in general, because they do not have a tradition for coffee co-operatives, or 
because fewer co-operatives have applied for FLO certification. The average foundation year 
varies from 1985 (Peru) to 2001 (Ecuador). Costa Rica has the earliest average FLO register 
year, 1990, and Ecuador and El Salvador the latest, 2003. There is some variation in the 
average number of members per co-operative, with Honduras having 91, while in the 
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Dominican Republic co-operatives have an average of 2828 members. The average coffee 
plot size per member varies from 1.1 (Guatemala) to 3.7 (Venezuela).  
Description of variables 
Democracy 
The concept of democracy is not much discussed in the corporate governance literature, but 
there is considerable focus on how directors and shareholders may control the management so 
that the company is managed in the best interest of the shareholders (Mallin 2004). 
Monitoring performance is a key element. When it fails there is a tendency for company 
investment to shift in favor of the management’s personal preferences rather than to maximize 
share value (Monks and Minow 2008). To avoid this information flow from management and 
oversight by directors and shareholders are important (ibid).  
Several studies have assessed the impact profit sharing, worker ownership and worker 
participation in decision making at firm level has on the effectiveness of the organisation 
(Cable and Fitzroy 1980, Jones and Svejnar 1985, Doucouliagos 1995). Studies often compare 
different types of legally defined firms and not different management procedures in firms of 
the same type. An exception is Yates (2001), who in her study of unions and employee share 
ownership in Ohio also looks at aspects such as methods of communication from management 
to employees and different types of work unit participatory techniques.  
In this paper I assume that all the co-operatives have roughly similar legal structures, 
that is, they are membership owned, with a one member one vote system. The purpose is to 
compare democracy in these co-operatives, based on the information collected by the FLO 
inspectors. A variable is first created that takes into account questions from the FLO 
evaluation scheme that can be associated with democracy. A list of these questions, or 
variables, is found in appendix 1. I have selected the variables that reflect the structure of the 
democratic organisation, meaning which institutions are in place, how much information is 
distributed and the participation among members in numbers. The intention is to measure 
democracy as structures implemented, and not as characteristics of the members.  
Appendix 1 shows the summary statistics and the correlation matrix for the democratic 
variables. Most observations have a value of either 1 (yes), 2 (partly) or 3 (no), the others are 
quantitative Most of the evaluations have some missing observations, and in order not to lose 
too many observations, missing observations are replaced with the mean for the remaining 
observations. The first principal component for the democratic variables is in appendix 4. The 
final democracy variable is continuous and goes from 0 to 1, where 0 is least and 1 is most 
democratic. To check that the results are not driven by the replacement of missing values, I 
also experiment with a complementary method (means of the available indicators for each 
cooperative) for aggregating the sub-indicators. The results of using this alternative method 
are reported in appendix 6.  
Later I will introduce other measures for democratic institutions, dividing variables 
into three categories and merge them into three new variables: transparency, participation and 
administration. 
11 
 
Economic success: price offer 
In the first econometric analysis economic success will be measured by one single variable: 
the price offered by the co-operative to members. This is the evaluation question that best 
captures the main economic benefit that members receive from the co-operative. Coffee 
marketing is the main activity of the co-operative, and assumingly it puts its efforts into doing 
well in order to obtain the best possible price for its members. How much the co-operative can 
offer members for their coffee depends both on the transaction costs and on the price it 
receives from the buyers. The latter is related both to the international price level and to the 
amount of coffee sold under Fairtrade and organic conditions. The co-operative’s efforts 
therefore both need to be put into a marketing strategy which results in satisfactory sales 
prices, as well as cost minimising strategies. 
 In order to control for local price variation, I have deducted the price paid by local 
intermediaries from the co-operative price offer. This way the price captures the economic 
benefit of the co-operative compared to the local alternative. When this price difference is 
divided by the intermediary price we get the difference as a percentage. For the entire data set 
the mean for the price difference is 56% per kilo coffee and the median is 37%. The co-
operative price offer varies between 18% less and 400%8 more than the intermediary price. 
There is also substantial variation between co-operatives in the same year, as can be seen in 
the table below, which gives co-operative price offers for 2005 for countries with 4 or more 
observations: 
Table 2: Percentage difference between co-operative price offers and local price 2005  
Country Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bolivia 12 64 74 -3 229 
Colombia 11 7 15 -4 45 
Guatemala 4 38 48 -1 100 
Mexico 28 40 37 -18 106 
Peru 18 28 22 4 94 
Note: ((Co-operative price-intermediary price)/intermediary price), in USD per kilo. 
 
Very few of the evaluations state whether the price was paid for cherry, hulled, parchment or 
green coffee, but unless otherwise is written I have assumed that the price is paid for 
parchment coffee, which, according to the information in the evaluations, is the most common 
form of selling the coffee to the co-operative in Latin America. However, there is likely to be 
some extent of error due to this. 
Average coffee plot size 
The average coffee plot size for members could affect the price offer for several reasons. One 
is the fixed costs associated with each member in the co-operative, which possibly makes 
costs per unit of coffee produced higher in co-operatives where the members have less coffee 
                                                 
8 There are altogether 7 evaluations where the co-operative price is more than twice the intermediary price. The 
high difference can be explained by a very low intermediary price. 
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land. This is consistent with the findings of Bernard and Spielman (2009) from Ethiopia. The 
other reason is that the average coffee plot size may reflect characteristics of the member 
group, such as level of wealth, status or interest in coffee production. Assumingly larger 
farmers have more resources and are more able and motivated to participate in the co-
operative than the smaller farmers, which may influence both the democracy and the economy 
aspect. 
The mean for the average coffee plot size per member is 2,5 ha. The largest average 
for a Fairtrade co-operative is 6 ha, and the smallest is 0,25. Only 13% of the co-operatives 
have an average coffee plot size per member of more than 4 ha. Farmers with less than 10 ha 
are considered to be small scale, so there are no co-operatives comprised of mainly large scale 
farmers. In other words, there is variation in the data set concerning average size, but only 
within the lower range of what is considered small scale coffee farming.  
Ability 
As mentioned before, a positive association between democracy and economic success can be 
driven by a third factor. The ability or knowledge of the farmers can both affect to what extent 
farmers participate actively in the governance of a co-operative and how economically 
successful it is. In order to control for abilities of the group that do not change over time I use 
the fixed effects method. In addition, as a proxy for ability, I use the variable ‘active 
participation among members in meetings’. Assumingly members’ active participation in 
meetings does not reflect the structures imposed by the co-operative, but the innate 
characteristics of the group. Possibly a ‘weak’ group with little interest in or abilities to 
support the co-operative economically or with their time, will not participate actively in 
meetings, while the opposite will be the case for a ‘strong’ group. The counter argument to 
this is that more active participation creates more conflicts, slows down the decision making 
processes and hinders a positive development.  
In the majority of the evaluations (70%) the farmer members participate actively, in 
29% they partly participate actively, and in 1% they do not participate actively in meetings. 
This variable is positively correlated with democracy and weakly positively correlated with 
the variable that measures the difference between the co-operative price and the local price. 
There is also a positive correlation with size (larger producers participate more actively). 
FLO register year 
The number of years that a co-operative has been Fairtrade registered is likely to influence 
both the democracy and the economic success measure. With more experience and reputation 
the probability of finding importers in the Fairtrade market increases, which provides the co-
operative with extra incomes and hence a better price offer to members. FLO also puts 
pressure on the organisations to remain at an acceptable democratic level, and the 
expectations increase with years of registration9. Information about the register year is not a 
part of the questionnaire, but it is often found in the written summaries in the reports, on the 
register list from FLO, or, when available, the web pages of the co-operatives.  
                                                 
9Source: Interview Guilermo Denaux Jr., coffee coordinator FLO, March 2006 
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The first co-operative was Fairtrade certified in 1989 and half of the co-operatives in 
the dataset were certified before 1999. Nine co-operatives were inspected for the first time in 
2005.  
Number of members 
The number of members, or the size of the co-operative, can be expected to influence both 
economic success and democracy. To some extent there are economies of scale in coffee 
marketing, which means that the larger co-operatives should do better than the smaller ones. It 
has also been claimed that it is harder to organise a larger group collectively than a smaller 
one (Wade 1987), which means that the size of the co-operative can influence the democracy 
variable negatively. The average number of members is 570, the smallest co-operative has 17 
members and the largest 7503. 
Dummy variables 
I use both time dummies, country dummies and dummies for the inspectors in the analysis. 
Time dummies and country dummies are obviously important. Inspector dummies are 
necessary to avoid the problem that different inspectors can operate with different 
expectations and scales. 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Difference between log of co-operative price 
offer and log of local price 
223 0.38 0.33 -0.2 1.64 
Democracy PCA variable 285 0.79 0.2 0 1 
Average size members’ coffee plots 253 2.56 1.32 0.25 6.71 
Active participation 273 1.31 0.49 1 3 
Number of members in co-operative 276 570 982 17 7503 
Register year with FLO 269 1998 3.9 1989 2005 
 
3.2. Regression analysis: Democracy, price and size  
The aim of the regressions in this section is to see how democracy correlates with the co-
operative price offer relative to the local price. 
It is difficult to establish a causal link between democracy and economic success 
through econometric methods. As shown in section 2, there are several reasons why 
democracy may affect economic success positively. However, it could also be the other way 
around, that an economically well functioning co-operative more easily can afford the costs of 
democratic structures. This means that there could be an endogeneity problem. There may 
also be factors that cannot be controlled for which influence both aspects, meaning that there 
is a problem with omitted variables. There are no good instruments that can solve these 
problems, but with fixed effects it is possible to control for time invariant omitted variables.  
As the dependent variable I have used the log of co-operative price minus the log of 
the intermediary price. 
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The simple model for the regression analysis is the following: 
 
ititiitititit
localcoop cofsizedemoPP εφλδββ +++++=− 21)log(log  
 
The left hand side of the model is the difference between log of the co-operative price and log 
of the price paid by intermediaries, where i denotes co-operative and t is time. We want to see 
how this is related to democracy, the average size of the members’ coffee plots, and a vector 
of control variables δ , which includes FLO register year, active participation and number of 
members in the co-operative. We also include a country dummy iλ and inspector dummy itφ . 
itε is the error term. The standard errors are clustered at the co-operative level, thus allowing 
for difference in the variance of the error terms across clusters, and arbitrary correlation of the 
error terms within clusters. 
The results are shown in table 4. When country fixed effects are not included in the 
data set, democracy is negatively, but not significantly correlated with the price offer. When 
country fixed effects are included, the coefficient for democracy is positive, but not 
significant. Heterogeneity between the countries can explain why the coefficient for 
democracy is negative when not controlling for this. When inspector dummies are included 
(column 3), the coefficient for democracy increases to 0.32 and becomes significant at the 
10% level. This means that for one standard deviation increase in the democracy score, 0.2, 
the price difference increases by 6%. In the same column we see that the average coffee plot 
size for members has no significant effect on the price. The coefficient for the control variable 
for the members’ ability (active participation) is positively but not significantly correlated 
with price offer. The coefficient for co-operative size is positively, but not significantly 
correlated with the price offered by the co-operative. This suggests that economies of scale 
are not central or that it is counteracted by other factors. 
 
Fixed effects 
In order to control for time invariant omitted variables I run the same regressions with co-
operative fixed effects, expressed by itκ in the model below. Since only seven of the co-
operatives did not change their democracy score from the previous period I assume there is 
enough variation for a fixed effects analysis to make sense. 
 
itititfijitititijft
localcoop cofsizedemoPP εκλδββ ++∂++++=− 21)log(log  
The results are shown in column 4, table 4. The coefficient for the democracy variable is now 
positively significant at the 5% level. It also increases with fixed effects, from 0.31 to 0.83. 
One possible explanation for this is that a different subset of observations explains in the two 
cases: The observations included in the fixed effects regression is larger (197 instead of 191), 
because FLO register year, which is missing for some of the observations, does not enter this 
regression. The fixed effects regression only uses co-operatives with more than one 
observation. When I run the OLS with only co-operatives that have more than one 
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observation, the coefficient for democracy is 0.42. This confirms that the difference in 
observations used is part of the explanation for the difference in coefficients. The other part of 
the explanation is that this has to do with an omitted variable problem, which biases the 
results downwards. With fixed effects this problem is reduced, therefore the coefficient is 
higher.  
Table 4: Regressions with price difference as dependent variable 
  Dependent variable: Log coop price - log local price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Democracy pca variable -0.2 0.14 0.31* 0.83** 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.34) 
     
Average size 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.07 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) 
     
Active participation -0.09* -0.1* -0.05 -0.02 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.1) 
     
Number of members in 
co-operative/ 1000 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.25 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.3) 
     
Register year with FLO 0.002 -0.001 0.003  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
     
Cons -4.11 2.07 -5.68 -1.11 
 (14.83) (14.59) (14.34) (0.53) 
     
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes  
Inspector fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Co-operative fixed effects    Yes 
Observations 191 191 191 197 
R-squared 0.11 0.33 0.49 0.62 
*** Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level 
 
 As a robustness test the regressions of column 3 and 4 in table 4 are reproduced with 
the mean of the democracy variables, this produces similar results as with the PCA democracy 
variable, see appendix 6.  
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3.3. Economic success and democracy 
Measuring economic success 
The price offered by the co-operative is the most important economic benefit received by the 
members, and we would assume that the long term aim of every co-operative is that it should 
be as high as possible. However, it could be argued that a high price is the result of an 
unsustainable co-operative practice of paying out as much as possible to members and not 
spending enough on long term strategically important processes and investments. Possibly, in 
the more democratic co-operatives the wishes of the producers win through, and hence it is 
more likely that they will decide on a distribution of money in terms of a higher price. The 
counter argument to this is that in the long term investments and spending on co-operative 
activities should, if the co-operative is well managed economically, also lead to higher price 
offers.  
In any case, the price offer is only one measure, and to some extent it is prone to be 
influenced by coincidental factors such as a particularly good deal with an importer or an 
unusually low comparable local price, not to mention the always present possibility of errors 
in the information picked up by the FLO inspector. One way to get around this problem is to 
use more measures than only the price when estimating the economic success level of the 
cooperatives. Possibly these measures that can also say something about the economic 
sustainability of the co-operative and what the chances are that benefits will remain high in 
the future. The FLO questionnaire covers the theme of economic success by a number of 
different questions. One approach to the assessment of the relation between democracy and 
economic success is to merge these different economic success variables together and see how 
they are linked to the democracy variable. Other studies of economic performance in firms 
have also looked at more than just one aspect in order to measure this. These include changes 
in absenteeism, on-the-job performance, product quality, employee turnover, productivity, 
customer service, profitability, production costs (Yates 2006), return on capital, value added 
on assets and employment (Cable and FitzRoy 1980), and average capital stake per member 
(Jones and Svejnar 1985) 
The economic success variables selected from the FLO questionnaire are listed in the 
summary statistics in appendix 2. Here again, information is missing for some variables, in 
particular investments and cost. The fact that cost per kilo sold in some cases (3) is negative, 
exhibits the difficulties for the inspectors in capturing this information, which leads to a 
certain extent of errors in the data.  
As with the democracy variable missing observations are replaced with the mean. The 
variables were joined together by the principal component analysis and made into a single 
continuous variable with variation from 0 to 1, 1 being the highest score on economic success. 
Appendix 2 shows the correlation matrix and the first principal component for the economic 
success variable. 
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Description of the economic success variables 
This section describes the variables used for the economic success variable, and argues why 
they are signs of economic success. However, I am aware that the variables are complex and 
that they could measure several other aspects as well.  
The two first variables are based on the overall impression of the inspector concerning 
the economic situation of the co-operative.  
The third one, “members supply Fairtrade coffee”, measures the percentage of farmers 
that supply Fairtrade coffee to the co-operative. It says something about how committed the 
members are to the co-operative, and also how much of the co-operative’s sales that goes into 
the Fairtrade market, where prices are higher.  
“Delivery of products to the organisation is increasing / remaining stable in difficult 
situations” is also an indication of how strong the support from the member base is. This is 
important for the stability of the co-operative, which relies on member commitment in order 
to comply to the deliveries promised to importers.  
If the quality sample is accepted by importer(s), it means that the co-operative 
produces an acceptable level of quality and that it knows the market well and what importers 
expect concerning different quality levels.  
Not all the co-operatives are selling directly to importers; some go through another co-
operative or a second level marketing co-operative. Direct negotiations means that more of 
the benefits from marketing accrue to the co-operative. This is reflected in the variable “the 
group is directly negotiating with buyers”. 
 “Increasing sales on other markets (other than fair trade)”, is a variable that measures 
the level of diversification of the co-operative. Co-operatives that rely heavily only on 
Fairtrade coffee exports, can be seen as more vulnerable than co-operatives with several legs 
to stand on. The same aspect is measured by the variable “introduction of other sources of 
income for members / for the organisation”.  
 To build up working capital is very important for the co-operatives, since interest rate 
payment for loans to pay farmers when they deliver their coffee is generally one of the most 
important expenses that the co-operatives have. The alternative, to let the members wait for 
their payment, is risky since they will often sell to private purchasers instead. This aspect is 
measured by the variable “working capital has been built up”. A related measure, which FLO 
has not collected data on, is the level of co-operative debts. 
 “Decreasing dependency on external funding” means that the co-operative is 
becoming more independent. If it relies heavily on external funding, it is in a more vulnerable 
position. Managing to decrease its dependency on external funding indicates that its economic 
situation is improving. 
 The amount invested per member is also a measure of possible future incomes. This 
aspect is highlighted by many authors. According to Deininger (1995), ‘the co-operative’s 
economic viability hinges on its ability to generate investments necessary to attain the profit 
maximising firm size and invest in efficient equipment’ (Deininger 1995). An empirical study 
of South American co-operatives identified as one of the principal factors of success the 
ability of members to understand the importance of capitalisation and investment (Camacho et 
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al. 2005). In general the FLO registered co-operatives invest in items related to production 
and marketing, such as storage halls, office equipment, vehicles, coffee toasters and so on. 
 “Difference between price received by importer and price paid to member” measures 
the cost per kilo of the co-operative. 
 The last variable on the list is the number of international buyers. A co-operative with 
just one or very few buyers is more vulnerable than a co-operative with more buyers. 
Regression analysis: OLS 
The simple OLS regression is based on the model used previously, but with the economic 
success PCA variable as the dependent variable: 
 
ititfijitititijft cofsizedemoeco ελδββ +∂++++= 21  
 
The results of this regression can be seen in table 5. In this regression country and inspector 
fixed effects do not change the results as significantly as with the previous model. There is 
always a positive correlation between democracy and economic success, significant within the 
5% level. When country and inspector fixed effects are included (column 3), we get the result 
that a 1 point increase in the democracy score increases the score for economic success by 
0.19. There is a positive correlation with the size of the co-operative in terms of members, but 
the coefficient here is very small. 100 more members increase the economic success score 
with 0.05 points. The year the co-operative was registered with FLO is also statistically 
significant. Economically, the results show that one year of FLO registration increases 
economic success with 0.01, which is not very much.  
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Table 5: Regression results with Economic success PCA variable as dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Democracy pca variable 0.20*** 0.17** 0.19** 0.22** 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.1) 
     
Active participation -0.03 -0.05* -0.05 -0.05*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
     
Number of members in co-operative 0.03** 0.03** 0.05*** 0.09 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) 
     
Average coffee plot size 0.004 0.002 0.0004 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.1) 
     
Register year with FLO -0.009*** -0.01*** -0.01***  
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)  
     
Cons 18.47 21.57 24.86 -0.08 
 (6.30) (6.94) (7.63) (0.16) 
     
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes  
Inspector fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Co-operative fixed effects No No No Yes 
Observations 225 225 225 238 
R-squared 0.21 0.36 0.5 0.56 
*** Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level 
Fixed effects regression 
The model used is the same as in the previous fixed effects regression, but the economic 
success PCA variable is used instead of the price offer. 
itititiitititijft cofsizedemoeco εκλδββ ++∂++++= 21  
The results of the regression can be seen in column 5, table 5. They are basically the same as 
the ones of the OLS regression, confirming the positive correlation between democracy and 
economic success. The size of the co-operative is not significant anymore, which could be 
because the change in size is not as important as the relative size. Active participation is 
negative and significant, meaning that the less the members participate in meetings the lower 
is the economic success score. 
 Similar results are produced when using the mean of the economic success and 
democracy variables, see appendix 6. 
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3.4. Participation, transparency and administration 
So far only one measure of democratic institutions has been used. Using other variable 
selections as democratic measures is interesting as a robustness check of the previous results. 
It could also make it possible to assess which of the institutional structures are most important 
for the economic success of the co-operative. In the following I will check if also other 
measures of democratic institutions are positively correlated with price offer and the 
economic success variable. I have merged different evaluation questions together to form 
variables that are supposed to measure certain characteristics of the institutional qualities of 
the co-operatives. The new variables are constructed from the evaluation questions related to 
three different categories: participation, transparency and administration. 
 It would seem natural to assume that the higher the percentage of members that 
participate at the co-operative meetings, the more the members influence the decisions taken. 
But this might not be the case: for instance, low participation could both be a sign of high 
satisfaction with the rulers, or a sign of apathy and resignation (Bollen 1980). How 
participation associate with the economic success of the co-operative is an open question: On 
the one hand, high participation could bring out the best suggestions and decisions, and 
legitimise those decisions to a higher degree. But on the other hand, more active participants 
could also mean more time consuming decision processes, and in addition the influence of 
uneducated farmers could lead to counterproductive decisions.  
Transparency in the co-operatives is interesting for several reasons. One is that 
procedures to increase transparency are likely to prevent corruption and mismanagement. The 
other is that more information dispersed to members should make them more apt to make 
more informed, hence better decisions, leading to a more prosperous economic situation.  
The administrative procedures of the co-operatives could be another interesting aspect. 
Since the organisations in question are composed of often uneducated members, one could 
assume that all the formal administrative procedures become a heavy burden for those in 
charge, and perhaps an unnecessary one. On the other hand, it could also be the case that, 
although they are burdensome, these administrative structures are important for the co-
operative affairs to work properly. 
The three variables have been constructed with principal component analysis in the 
same way as the democracy and economic success variable in the previous sections. It is not 
always obvious which measures should be selected for which variable10. Summary statistics, 
correlation matrices and the first principal components for the variables included in the 
different measures are found in appendix 3, 4 and 5.  
                                                 
10 The results below are robust to changing sub-indicators that possibly could belong to more than one category. 
For instance, frequency of meetings could belong to the participation measure instead of the transparency 
measure, or existence of minutes of meetings could belong to the transparency measure instead of the 
administration measure. 
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Table 6: Correlation matrix 
  Administration Transparency Participation
Administration 1   
Transparency 0.67 1  
Participation 0.1 0.24 1 
 
The administration and transparency variables are highly correlated, and participation is more 
correlated with the transparency variable than the administration variable. 
Table 7: Summary statistics: 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Administration 285 0.78 0.24 0 1 
Transparency 285 0.8 0.2 0 1 
Participation 285 0.57 0.2 0 1 
 
The three variables are first run in a fixed effects regression by themselves, then together, 
with price difference as the dependent variable. The results are listed in table 8. 
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Table 8: Regression results different democracy measures 
 Dependent variable: Price difference 
Dependent 
variable: 
Economic success
Administration 0.38   0.43 0.14* 
 (0.27)   (0.28) (0.07) 
      
Transparency  0.53***  0.58*** 0.14* 
  (0.2)  (0.21) (0.07) 
      
Participation   0.23 0.05 0.08 
   (0.17) (0.19) (0.05) 
      
Average coffee plot size -0.07 0.003 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.03) 
      
Number of members in co-
operative 0.18 0.19 0.28 0.17 0.09 
 (0.3) (0.28) (0.29) (0.31) (0.07) 
      
Constant 0.58 0.28 0.57 -0.27 0.18 
 (0.34) (0.4) (0.32) (0.44) (0.16) 
      
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inspector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Co-operative fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
R squared 0.54 0.56 0.53 0.59 0.54 
Number of observations 204 204 204 204 248 
*** Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level 
 
Administration, transparency and participation are positively correlated with the price 
difference when run on their own, but only the coefficient for transparency is significant. This 
supports the findings from the previous section, that the institutional structures implemented 
by the cooperatives do not affect their economic performance negatively. On the contrary the 
observed correlation indicates that they could lead to improvements in the price offer and 
hence more economic benefits for the members.  
When all three variables are run together, only the coefficient for transparency is 
significant. Note that adding the two other dimension of institutional quality leaves  the 
coefficient on transparency almost unchanged.  
When the regression with all the different measures is run with the economic success 
principal component variable as the dependent variable, the result is similar to the previous 
23 
 
regression. This strengthens the results of the analysis made with the democracy variable. It 
indicates again that democratic structures are important for the creation of an economically 
successful organization, and that the transparency aspect that is of higher importance than 
participation and administration. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Some of the theoretical predictions concerning the relationship between democracy and 
economic success indicate that it is difficult to obtain both these aims at the same time. The 
qualitative field study from Chiapas suggests that there is a tension between these two aspects, 
but the general view is that a democratic strategy is still the best route to economic 
development. The expected positive relationship between democracy and economic success is 
found in the statistical analysis of the Fairtrade coffee co-operative data base, both when price 
offered to members is used as the measure for economic success, and when a range of 
different economic variables compressed into one success measure is employed.  
Hence, the results indicate that the link between democracy and economic success is 
positive. This is also the case when other measures for institutional quality are used. Whether 
related to the administrative structures, the transparency or the participation of members, there 
are no signs that democracy inhibits economic success. In particular transparency seem to 
correlate positively with measures for economic success. 
Finding out whether there is a positive or negative correlation is important for the co-
operatives, FLO and the customers who buy the Fairtrade labelled products. A negative 
correlation could be an indication that democracy should be promoted in a way different from 
what it is today.  Since the results of this analysis indicate a positive relationship, the policy 
advice indicated from this analysis is that promoting democracy and economic success at the 
same time and in the way that it is done with these co-operatives, is constructive.  
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Appendix 1: Summary statistics and correlation matrix democracy variable  
Table  A.1.1: Summary statistics democracy variable 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
General judgement on whether minimum requirements for 
democracy, participation and transparency are fulfilled  276 1.3 0.5 1 3 
The organisational structure as laid out in the statutes is 
democratic  280 1.1 0.2 1 2 
The executive (board) is democratically elected  279 1.1 0.3 1 3 
Regular updates given to members  x times per year 268 5.7 4.8 1 24 
Regular updates given to members: written 269 1.8 1.0 1 3 
Regular updates given to members: in meetings 275 1.1 0.4 1 3 
Regular updates given to members about the financial 
situation  274 1.1 0.5 1 3 
Regular updates given to members about the state of 
commercial activities (contracts, prices, buyers)  270 1.2 0.5 1 3 
Regular updates given to members about committee activities  262 1.3 0.7 1 3 
Regular updates given to members about the state of projects  227 1.8 1.0 1 3 
Frequency per year of General Assemblies of members 264 2.3 2.9 0 22 
Frequency per year of Meetings of Representatives/Delegates 233 11.0 9.6 0 52 
Frequency per year of Meetings on community level 197 10.7 6.7 0 50 
Attendence in percentage General Assemblies of members 239 78.9 17.4 21 100 
Annual report and accounts presented to members 216 89.6 10.8 40 100 
Attendence in percentage Meetings of 
Representatives/Delegates 174 84.0 14.1 45 100 
Attendence in percentage Meetings on community level 272 1.2 0.5 1 3 
Annual report and accounts presented to members: written  268 1.6 0.9 1 3 
Annual report and accounts presented to members: in meetings 268 1.3 0.7 1 3 
Financial information explained to members  275 1.3 0.6 1 3 
Annual report and accounts are approved by the members  272 1.3 0.7 1 3 
A filing system exists  277 1.2 0.5 1 3 
A bookkeeping system exists  275 1.3 0.7 1 3 
Minutes of meetings exist  277 1.1 0.4 1 3 
Plans are approved by the General Assembly  253 1.5 0.8 1 3 
Producers/members are informed about price fixing  
mechanisms and decisions taken  274 1.5 0.6 1 3 
Policies and plans are discussed with members in meetings  269 1.3 0.6 1 3 
 
 
Table A1.2: Correlation matrix democratic variables
sdem demostr demelec infflow infwrit infmeet inffin infcom infcomi infpro frgenasm frmrep frmcom atgenm atmrep atmcom anrep anrepwr anrepm fininf~m anrepam filsys booksys minmeet planapga infpfix poldis
sdem 1.00
demostr 0.22 1.00
demelec 0.31 0.31 1.00
infflow ‐0.07 ‐0.07 0.04 1.00
infwrit 0.29 0.06 0.16 0.03 1.00
infmeet 0.08 ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.09 0.02 1.00
inffin 0.23 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.25 0.17 1.00
infcom 0.03 ‐0.07 ‐0.03 ‐0.02 0.12 0.08 0.24 1.00
infcomi 0.04 0.04 0.10 ‐0.09 0.16 0.09 0.20 0.19 1.00
infpro ‐0.05 ‐0.01 0.08 0.06 0.16 ‐0.01 ‐0.03 0.09 0.11 1.00
frgenasm 0.00 ‐0.06 ‐0.04 0.29 0.13 ‐0.05 0.06 ‐0.04 0.09 0.12 1.00
frmrep ‐0.05 ‐0.06 ‐0.06 0.06 0.10 0.11 ‐0.06 ‐0.08 ‐0.10 0.09 0.09 1.00
frmcom 0.08 ‐0.11 ‐0.06 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.00 ‐0.04 ‐0.09 0.01 0.00 0.13 1.00
atgenm ‐0.15 ‐0.08 ‐0.18 0.11 ‐0.09 ‐0.08 ‐0.10 ‐0.02 ‐0.09 0.09 ‐0.06 0.08 0.01 1.00
atmrep ‐0.11 ‐0.03 ‐0.06 0.18 0.00 ‐0.21 ‐0.04 0.07 ‐0.03 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.37 1.00
atmcom ‐0.04 ‐0.10 ‐0.07 0.20 0.15 ‐0.09 ‐0.04 0.05 ‐0.07 0.04 0.02 0.14 0.23 0.23 0.31 1.00
anrep 0.34 0.16 0.17 ‐0.03 0.27 0.09 0.34 0.15 0.28 0.07 0.08 ‐0.09 0.11 ‐0.08 ‐0.05 ‐0.05 1.00
anrepwr 0.31 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.60 ‐0.04 0.28 0.07 0.19 0.11 0.21 0.14 0.04 ‐0.10 ‐0.03 0.09 0.39 1.00
anrepm ‐0.12 0.09 0.00 ‐0.12 ‐0.06 0.15 ‐0.02 0.01 ‐0.01 ‐0.02 ‐0.06 0.04 ‐0.15 ‐0.17 ‐0.12 ‐0.19 ‐0.03 ‐0.18 1.00
fininfexm 0.36 0.08 0.19 ‐0.13 0.32 0.06 0.39 0.15 0.22 0.01 0.04 ‐0.07 0.05 ‐0.11 ‐0.03 ‐0.07 0.61 0.42 ‐0.04 1.00
anrepam 0.42 0.04 0.20 ‐0.11 0.38 0.02 0.24 0.05 0.21 ‐0.10 0.06 ‐0.03 0.14 ‐0.10 ‐0.14 0.00 0.56 0.48 ‐0.06 0.49 1.00
filsys 0.17 0.02 ‐0.03 ‐0.13 0.29 0.03 0.18 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.13 0.00 ‐0.01 0.04 ‐0.05 0.01 0.24 0.28 ‐0.03 0.21 0.29 1.00
booksys 0.17 ‐0.07 ‐0.04 ‐0.12 0.38 0.00 0.19 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.04 ‐0.06 0.07 0.33 0.33 0.02 0.25 0.31 0.62 1.00
minmeet 0.26 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.24 0.07 0.13 0.17 0.05 ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.05 0.14 0.00 0.00 ‐0.03 0.42 0.16 0.00 0.18 0.31 0.16 0.14 1.00
planapga 0.27 0.23 0.08 ‐0.10 0.25 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.08 ‐0.11 ‐0.04 ‐0.13 ‐0.03 ‐0.18 ‐0.22 ‐0.08 0.30 0.22 ‐0.01 0.22 0.34 0.09 0.08 0.19 1.00
infpfix 0.32 0.15 0.20 ‐0.04 0.31 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.27 0.22 ‐0.04 0.31 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.03 1.00
poldis 0.33 0.03 0.08 ‐0.13 0.15 ‐0.02 0.06 0.06 0.02 ‐0.04 ‐0.01 ‐0.15 0.12 ‐0.10 ‐0.15 ‐0.02 0.22 0.18 ‐0.05 0.16 0.29 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.36 0.29 1.00
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics, principal component and correlation matrix economic 
success variable 
Table A.2.1: Summary statistics economic success measures 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
General judgement on whether minimum requirements 
fulfilled concerning the ability to export 
267 1.3 0.6 1 3 
General judgement on the economic Strengthening of the 
Organisation: Process requirements included in work plan 
247 1.7 0.8 1 3 
Members supply Fairtrade coffee 225 84.9 27.6 0 100 
Delivery of products to the organisation is increasing / 
remaining stable in difficult situations 
252 1.4 0.8 1 3 
Quality sample accepted by importer(s) 251 1.1 0.3 1 3 
The group is directly negotiating with buyers 275 1.9 0.9 1 3 
Increasing sales on other markets (other than fair trade) 264 2.2 1.0 1 3 
Introduction of other sources of income for members / for 
the organisation, 
266 1.9 0.9 1 3 
Working capital has been built up 258 1.8 1.0 1 3 
Decreasing dependency on external funding 247 2.2 0.9 1 3 
Amount invested per member, in USD 198 207.1 351 0 2202
Difference between price offered by co-operative and local 
intermediary 
223 0.35 0.34 -0.33 1.56 
Difference between price received by importer and price 
paid to member 
154 0.96 0.55 -1.23 2.72 
Number of international buyers  221 3.7 2.9 0 19 
Table A.2.2: First principal component economic success variable 
sexp General judgement on whether minimum requirements fulfilled concerning the 
ability to export 0.4384
seco General judgement on the economic Strengthening of the Organisation: 
Process requirements included in work plan 0.3663
memsupft Members supply Fairtrade coffee -0.1571
deldif Delivery of products to the organisation is increasing / remaining stable in 
difficult situations 0.2215
sampacp Quality sample accepted by importer(s) 0.1706
groupdir The group is directly negotiating with buyers 0.3284
incsal Increasing sales on other markets (other than fair trade) 0.2648
othinc Introduction of other sources of income for members / for the organisation, 0.2469
workcap Working capital has been built up 0.3649
depext Decreasing dependency on external funding 0.3401
aminvm Amount invested per member, in USD -0.0945
diffav Difference between price offered by co-operative and local intermediary -0.0051
cost1 Difference between price received by importer and price paid to member 0.042
Nbuyint Number of international buyers  -0.2688
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Table A.2.3: Correlation matrix economic success variables 
 
 sexp Seco memsup~1 Deldif sampacp groupdir incsal othinc workcap depext aminvm1 diffav Cost1 nbuyint 
sexp 1                      
seco 0.289 1                     
memsupft1 ‐0.241 ‐0.044  1                  
deldif 0.107 0.057  ‐0.034 1                
sampacp 0.243 0.049  ‐0.014 0.004 1              
groupdir 0.431 0.139  0.039 0.019 0.089 1            
incsal 0.112 0.188  ‐0.044 0.123 ‐0.007 0.177 1           
othinc 0.075 0.150  ‐0.038 0.111 0.010 0.065 0.162  1        
workcap 0.213 0.171  ‐0.020 0.227 0.097 0.133 0.041  0.196 1      
depext 0.131 0.227  ‐0.088 0.146 0.077 0.095 0.165  0.065 0.408 1     
aminvm ‐0.087 ‐0.104  0.034 ‐0.095 ‐0.072 0.066 0.056  ‐0.129 ‐0.020 ‐0.096 1     
diffav 0.044 0.015  ‐0.016 ‐0.102 ‐0.054 ‐0.158 ‐0.038  0.211 ‐0.031 ‐0.043 ‐0.039 1   
Cost1 0.075 0.073  0.009 ‐0.008 ‐0.023 ‐0.067 0.046  0.031 ‐0.070 0.052 ‐0.028 0.045 1  
Nbuyint ‐0.207 ‐0.192  0.115 ‐0.057 ‐0.013 ‐0.191 ‐0.142  ‐0.151 ‐0.083 ‐0.017 ‐0.091 ‐0.104 ‐0.042  1 
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Appendix 3: Summary statistics for other democracy measures: 
Table A.3.1: Administration measures 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
A person is hired / nominated in charge of general 
administration 276 1.51 0.84 1 3 
A person is hired / nominated in charge of bookkeeping 275 1.25 0.60 1 3 
Filing system exists 277 1.22 0.52 1 3 
Bookkeeping system exists 275 1.31 0.66 1 3 
Minutes of meetings exist 277 1.13 0.42 1 3 
A cash flow forecast exists 259 2.02 0.96 1 3 
A business plan exists 261 2.24 0.91 1 3 
Table A.3.2: Transparency measures 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Regular updates given to members  x times per year 268 5.71 4.77 1 24 
Written 269 1.80 0.98 1 3 
in meetings 275 1.08 0.39 1 3 
financial situation 274 1.14 0.51 1 3 
Information about state of commercial activities (contracts, 
prices, buyers) 270 1.16 0.54 1 3 
committee activities 262 1.26 0.67 1 3 
state of projects 227 1.84 0.99 1 3 
Frequency per year of General Assemblies of members 264 2.28 2.89 0 22 
Frequency per year of Meetings of Representatives/Delegates 233 11.03 9.62 0 52 
Annual report and accounts presented to members 272 1.19 0.48 1 3 
Written 268 1.59 0.91 1 3 
in meetings 268 1.27 0.68 1 3 
Financial information explained to members 275 1.27 0.55 1 3 
Producers/members are informed about price fixing mechanisms 
and decisions taken 274 1.46 0.63 1 3 
Is an internal control system implemented 278 5.71 4.77 1 3 
Table A.3.3: Participation measures 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Active participation of members in meetings  273 1.31 0.49 1 3 
Information understandable by members  275 1.49 0.52 1 3 
Attendence in % General Assemblies of members 239 78.95 17.47 21 100 
Attendence in % Meetings of Representatives/Delegates 217 89.63 10.82 40 100 
Attendence in % Meetings on community level 176 84.43 12.57 45 100 
Explanations understandable by members 264 1.57 0.55 1 3 
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Appendix 4: First principal component for democracy, transparency, participation, 
administration 
 Code  Evaluation question Demo-
cracy 
Trans-
parency 
Partici-
pation 
Adminis-
tration 
sdem 
General judgement on whether minimum requirements for 
democracy, participation and transparency are fulfilled  0.281 
   
demostr 
The organisational structure as laid out in the statutes is 
democratic  0.094 
   
demelec The executive (board) is democratically elected  0.139    
infflow Regular updates given to members  x times per year -0.051 -0.026   
infwrit Regular updates given to members: written 0.294 0.376   
infmeet Regular updates given to members: in meetings 0.046 0.059   
inffin 
Regular updates given to members about the financial 
situation  0.219 0.324 
  
infcom 
Regular updates given to members about the state of 
commercial activities (contracts, prices, buyers)  0.100 0.177 
  
infcomi 
Regular updates given to members about committee 
activities  0.151 0.250 
  
infpro 
Regular updates given to members about the state of 
projects  0.018 0.096 
  
frgenasm Frequency per year of General Assemblies of members 0.055 0.117   
frmrep 
Frequency per year of Meetings of 
Representatives/Delegates -0.032 -0.006 
  
frmcom Frequency per year of Meetings on community level 0.043    
atgenm 
Attendence in percentage General Assemblies of 
members -0.088
 
-0.273 
 
atmrep 
Attendence in percentage Meetings of 
Representatives/Delegates -0.070
 
-0.372 
 
atmcom Attendence in percentage Meetings on community level -0.012  -0.281  
anrep Annual report and accounts presented to members 0.345 0.412   
anrepwr 
Annual report and accounts presented to members: 
written  0.310 0.403 
  
anrepm 
Annual report and accounts presented to members: in 
meetings  -0.039 -0.063 
  
fininfexm Financial information explained to members  0.322 0.425   
anrepam Annual report and accounts are approved by the members 0.345    
filsys A filing system exists  0.215   0.466 
booksys A bookkeeping system exists  0.228   0.481 
minmeet Minutes of meetings exist   0.204   0.065 
planapga Plans are approved by the General Assembly  0.211    
infpfix 
Producers/members are informed about price fixing  
mechanisms and decisions taken  0.211 
0.265   
poldis 
Policies and plans are discussed with members in 
meetings  0.186 
   
intcon Is an internal control system implemented  0.213   
actpart Active participation of members in meetings    0.459  
infund Information understandable by members    0.506  
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exundm Explanations understandable by members   0.492  
pchgad A person is hired / nominated in charge of general 
administration 
   
0.474 
pchbook A person is hired / nominated in charge of bookkeeping    0.447 
cashfl A cash flow forecast exists    0.282 
busplan A business plan exists    0.210 
 
Appendix 5: Correlation matrices for administration, transparency and participation 
Table A.5.1: Correlation matrix administration measures 
 pchgad pchbook filsys booksys minmeet cashfl busplan
pchgad 1       
pchbook 0.541 1      
filsys 0.508 0.454 1     
booksys 0.554 0.475 0.621 1    
minmeet 0.020 -0.024 0.155 0.145 1   
cashfl 0.263 0.239 0.190 0.233 -0.040 1  
busplan 0.141 0.194 0.152 0.112 -0.062 0.365 1 
 
Table A.5.2: Correlation matrix participation measures 
 actpart Infund atgenm atmrep Atmcom exundm 
actpart 1      
infund 0.322 1     
atgenm -0.167 -0.003 1    
atmrep -0.210 -0.085 0.371 1   
atmcom -0.112 -0.094 0.232 0.311 1  
exundm 0.305 0.629 0.006 -0.106 -0.018 1 
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Table A.5.3: Correlation matrix transparency measures 
 infflow1 Infwrit infmeet inffin infcom Infcomi infpro frgena~1 frmrep1 anrep anrepwr anrepm fininf~m Infpfix intcon
infflow1 1               
infwrit 0.030 1              
infmeet -0.093 0.024 1             
Inffin 0.039 0.245 0.169 1            
infcom -0.019 0.123 0.084 0.241 1           
infcomi -0.090 0.158 0.089 0.198 0.195 1          
Infpro 0.060 0.159 -0.008 -0.030 0.088 0.111 1         
frgenasm1 0.286 0.133 -0.047 0.058 -0.041 0.094 0.118 1        
frmrep1 0.064 0.104 0.112 -0.059 -0.076 -0.105 0.095 0.087 1       
Anrep -0.028 0.272 0.087 0.339 0.149 0.276 0.071 0.077 -0.090 1      
anrepwr 0.015 0.597 -0.040 0.276 0.073 0.192 0.106 0.212 0.141 0.387 1     
anrepm -0.125 -0.055 0.148 -0.016 0.014 -0.013 -0.023 -0.065 0.043 -0.033 -0.185 1    
fininfexm -0.130 0.319 0.060 0.388 0.146 0.222 0.010 0.037 -0.074 0.614 0.418 -0.040 1   
infpfix -0.043 0.313 0.000 0.112 0.114 0.104 0.090 0.006 -0.004 0.268 0.219 -0.039 0.310 1  
intcon -0.108 0.203 -0.038 0.174 0.037 0.114 -0.020 0.108 -0.004 0.222 0.162 0.031 0.229 0.061 1 
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Appendix 6: Means of democracy and economic success variables 
Table A.6: Regression results mean democracy and economic success scores 
 
 
Dependent variable: Log coop 
price - log local price 
Dependent variable: Mean 
economic success score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mean democracy score 0.3** 0.39* 0.37*** 0.39** 
 (0.15) (0.24) (0.13) (0.18) 
     
Average size 0.003 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 
 (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.06) 
     
Active participation -0.05 -0.05 0.1 0.1* 
 (0.06) (0.1) (0.08) (0.05) 
     
Number of members in 
co-operative/ 1000 0.001 0.3 -0.08*** -0.15 
 (0.03) (0.29) (0.03) (0.21) 
     
Register year with FLO 0.003  0.02***  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
     
Cons -4.9 0.24 -45.5 1.89 
 (13.98) (0.37) (16.19) (0.38) 
     
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Inspector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Co-operative fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Observations 191 197 225 238 
R-squared 0.49 0.59 0.44 0.5 
*** Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level 
 
Note: The mean democracy score and the mean economic success score are made from the mean of all the 
variables included in the PCA democracy and economic success variables. Quantitative variables have been 
reduced to the 1, 2, 3 levels. 
 
 
